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I. Introduction 
Our stratified society has long imbued race, gender, and class 
with social and material meaning.1 Perceived differences become 
                                                                                                     
 ∗  Jacob Burns Foundation Professor of Clinical Law, George Washington 
University Law School.  Thanks to Esna Abdulamit for research assistance and 
to the Washington & Lee Law Review for an enriching symposium on capital 
punishment organized around the compelling case of Commonwealth v. 
Giarratano.  I extend my gratitude to the participants in the symposium for their 
engagement with these weighty matters. 
 1. See generally CHRISTOPHER B. DOOB, SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL 
STRATIFICATION IN U.S. SOCIETY (2013). Part 1 of Doob’s text develops in a global 
context general concepts and theories of social stratification. Id. at 1–119. Part 2, 
entitled Class, Race, and Gender, contains six chapters on class, poverty, racism, 
and sexism. Id. at 120–346. The author’s aim is to “examine the processes that 
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embedded in our social structures, enabling them to powerfully 
influence our institutional operations while remaining largely in 
the backdrop, often unnoticed and unspoken despite their profound 
impact.2 The American criminal justice system—especially its 
death penalty systems—are premier examples of institutions that 
operate in a manner deeply affected by structures of race, gender, 
and class.3 
In some criminal and capital cases, the workings of race, 
gender, and class are more evident than in others. If a poor 
African-American man is charged with the rape and murder of a 
wealthy white woman, race, gender, and class will not be 
irrelevant characteristics in the popular understanding of the 
crime and the processing of the criminal case.4 If one or more of the 
race, gender, and class characteristics of defendant and victim are 
switched, the case will be viewed differently.5 Consequently, many 
people acknowledge the likelihood that beliefs about the meaning 
of these categories, even those that are unconsciously held, can 
                                                                                                     
have produced and sustained” inequalities in the U.S. between “select groups—
higher-class members, whites, and males” who “have had better opportunities 
and, therefore, more extensive rewards” than have “lower-class people, racial and 
ethnic minorities, and women.” Id. at 1. 
 2. See id. at 2 (defining social stratification as “a deeply embedded 
hierarchy providing different groups varied rewards, resources, and privileges 
and establishing social relationships that both determine and legitimate those 
outcomes”). 
 3. See infra Parts II–III (analyzing how structures of subordination affect 
criminal justice processes). 
 4. Justice William Brennan recognized this reality with respect to race in 
his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp. See 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (noting that a lawyer for a capital defendant, in particular a black 
defendant charged with killing a white victim, would have to inform his/her client 
that “there was a significant chance that race would play a prominent role in 
determining if he lived or died”). 
 5. For this reason, Professor Cynthia Lee proposes that judges give 
“race-switching” jury instructions in criminal cases that are especially susceptible 
to racial stereotyping, asking jurors to switch the races of the defendants and the 
victims in their minds to see if race-switching alters their conclusion. See Cynthia 
Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 
81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 482–85 (1996) (examining the operation, and the procedural 
possibilities for amelioration, of racial stereotypes in jury decision-making). If it 
does, this evidence of race bias encourages jurors to reconsider their initial 
conclusion about the case at issue. Id. at 488–95. Presumably, Lee’s proposal can 
be extended in appropriate cases to encompass gender and class issues as well. 
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animate the handling of a criminal case and influence its 
outcomes.6 
Giarratano v. Commonwealth7 is not a case in which the 
enduring features of race, gender, and class are readily understood 
to be influential.8 Nonetheless, if these categories operate 
structurally in criminal cases, we should be able to excavate the 
role that they play in Giarratano’s case or any other. In this essay, 
I accept that challenge and seek to examine the interactive role of 
race, gender, and class in capital cases in general and the 
Giarratano case in particular. Through this effort, I hope to 
cultivate a deeper understanding of the more hidden ways that 
race, gender, and class can affect the death penalty system, 
including the ways it can threaten the accuracy of fact-finding on 
which the legitimacy of the capital sanction depends.  
The reality that race, gender, and class structures affect the 
operation of American death penalty systems represents a 
profound concern about inequality and unfairness in the selection 
of defendants for death. But it also represents an indictment of 
American systems of capital punishment. According to the United 
States Supreme Court, the death penalty—among the gravest acts 
of government authority—can satisfy Eighth Amendment 
                                                                                                     
 6. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our cases 
reflect a realization of the myriad of opportunities for racial considerations to 
influence criminal proceedings.”); see also Jenny E. Carroll, Images of Women and 
Capital Sentencing Among Female Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the 
Eighth Amendment and Articulated Theories of Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1413, 
1451 (1997) (“[T]he pervasiveness of gender expectations may well moot the 
necessity that they ever be raised explicitly in order to influence the sentencer’s 
decision.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 327, 322 (1987) 
(“Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has 
played and still plays a dominant role . . . . We do not recognize the ways in which 
our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on 
which those beliefs affect our actions.”); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, 
and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 590 
(1977) (arguing that sexism and racism are deeply embedded in our culture and 
unconsciously affect behavior). Sociologist Christopher Doob provides evidence to 
show that “among developed nations the United States has some of the highest 
levels of social inequality” and that “systems of class, racial, and gender 
stratification provide the conceptual foundations for analyzing trends in social 
inequality.” DOOB, supra note 1, at 2.  
 7. 266 S.E.2d 94 (Va. 1980). 
 8. See id. at 103 (affirming the defendant’s death sentence for rape and 
murder). 
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prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment only when it is 
administered non-arbitrarily and non-discriminatorily.9 Under the 
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, a capital punishment system 
must distinguish in a principled way between who is sentenced to 
death and who is not.10  
Consequently, when race, gender, and class play an 
explanatory role in decisions about who receives a death sentence, 
under the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence those 
decisions constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment.11 The effect of this jurisprudential 
command, in combination with other cultural influences, may be 
to suppress official acknowledgment of the role that race, gender, 
and class play in death penalty decision-making, even where their 
work is obvious.12 The upshot of acknowledging their role is to 
                                                                                                     
 9. These are the primary Eighth Amendment requirements that the 
Supreme Court established in its per curiam opinion in Furman v. Georgia. See 
408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (finding the death penalty as applied to be 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment). Although each Justice wrote 
separately and no single opinion controlled, Justice Stewart’s opinion expressed 
concerns echoed by other Justices in Furman and subsequent cases: 
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that 
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. . . . [I]f any basis can be 
discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to death, it is 
the constitutionally impermissible basis of race . . . . [T]he Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of 
death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so 
wantonly and so freakishly imposed. 
Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 10. According to Furman, the failure to establish a procedural system that 
could rationally distinguish death-worthy and non-death-worthy cases rendered 
the death penalty cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 
id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is highly implausible that only the worst 
criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this 
punishment. No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in 
those terms the few who die from the many who go to prison.”); id. at 313 (White, 
J., concurring) (“[T]here is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases 
in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 6, at 1451 (“[T]he use of gender-specific 
traits as mitigators or aggravators during the sentencing phase of the trial runs 
counter to the Furman goal of nonarbitrary application of the death penalty by 
introducing constitutionally impermissible factors to the sentencer.”); see also 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 341 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“[E]vidence that race may play even a modest role in levying a death sentence 
should be enough to characterize that sentence as ‘cruel and unusual.’”).  
 12. See Lawrence, supra note 6, at 322 (“[T]he human mind defends itself 
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seriously undermine the legal structure of our death penalty 
system and its claim to impartial and legally principled decisions 
about who will be allowed to live and who will not.13  
Although this essay does not focus on doctrinal arguments 
under the Eighth Amendment, it is important to note at the outset 
that the arguments it develops about the entanglement of race, 
gender, and class structures in capital decision-making processes, 
including those that condemned Joseph Giarratano, have profound 
Eighth Amendment implications.14 These implications hang like a 
shadow over America’s death penalty, representing reasons for 
official reluctance to acknowledge what is readily apparent and 
deeply important. In the process, the integrity of that system, one 
that refuses to recognize the visible presence of what law requires 
to be absent, is greatly diminished.15  
II. The Role of Race 
I begin with two uncontroversial observations: The death 
penalty has played a role of long standing in American culture16 
                                                                                                     
against the discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, 
wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the individual has learned is good or 
right.”). 
 13. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the majority’s fear of finding petitioner’s proof of race bias in death sentencing to 
be sufficient is based on its admitted reluctance to “open the door to widespread 
challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing” and therefore suggests “a fear of 
too much justice”). 
 14. See infra Parts II–III (analyzing race, gender, and class structures 
embedded in the death penalty system). 
 15. In his dissent in McCleskey, Justice Brennan eloquently expresses this 
concern:  
It is tempting to pretend that minorities on death row share a fate in 
no way connected to our own, that our treatment of them sounds no 
echoes beyond the chambers in which they die. Such an illusion is 
ultimately corrosive, for the reverberations of injustice are not so easily 
confined. 
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 16. 
In the more than three centuries since the earliest recorded lawful 
execution on these shores—1622, Daniel Frank, Colony of Virginia, for 
the crime of theft—there have been an estimated 18,000 to 20,000 
persons lawfully put to death. . . . Massive and familiar as its presence 
has been in American society, the practice of capital punishment has 
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and race has played a role of long standing in American culture.17 
Although these two starting points will not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that race and the death penalty are interconnected, the 
reality is—as abundant evidence reveals—that they are powerfully 
intertwined.18 One cannot understand America’s penologies of 
capital punishment—its legitimation of state-imposed death—
without understanding its ideologies of race, and vice versa.19 
Moreover, powerful ideologies of race interlock with other powerful 
ideologies, such as those of gender and class, ideologies that, 
reinforcing one another, create a complex hierarchy that separates 
the classes of those who decide others’ fate from those whose fates 
are decided.20 
A symposium based on the capital case of Joseph Giarratano, 
a white man, is not the most likely occasion for examining these 
questions about the entanglement of race and the death penalty. 
Nonetheless, it is a valuable occasion for examining these 
questions because, if the roles I ascribe to the ideologies and 
hierarchies of America’s social strata in the capital punishment 
                                                                                                     
undergone major developments in the past century. . . . 
HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3 (3d ed. 1982). 
 17. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS—THE COLONIAL PERIOD 391 (1978) (“[T]here is a nexus 
between the brutal centuries of colonial slavery and the racial polarization and 
anxieties of today.”). 
 18. See generally FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) 
(exploring the relationship between race and the death penalty). 
 19.  
[O]ur book is an effort . . . to show the ways that the death penalty is 
racialized, the places in the death penalty process where race makes a 
difference, and the ways the very meanings of race in the United States 
are constituted in and through our practices of capital punishment. . . . 
[T]he death penalty is, and has always been . . . a tool . . . to oppress 
racial minorities, and specifically, African-Americans.  
Id. at 3. See also Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic 
Divide: Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
573, 587 (2011) (“[R]acial animosity flourishes inside systems and structures of 
domination, especially ones that have been constructed explicitly to deliver pain 
or punishment on the basis of perceived wrongdoing. The processes of derogation 
and demonization that characterize racial oppression have much in common with 
the most punitive criminal justice practices . . . .”).  
 20. Sociologist Christopher Doob describes ideologies as “the complex of 
values and beliefs that support a society’s social-stratification systems and their 
distribution of wealth, income, and power.” DOOB, supra note 1, at 2.  
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process are accurate, then evidence of their operation should 
appear throughout a large volume of cases, not just in obvious 
ones. Therefore, this essay explores how structural hierarchies 
such as those built on ideas of racial difference are implicated in 
cases like Giarratano’s. 
A. History of Race Ideologies 
Accepting the challenge to examine the role of racial hierarchy 
in a case understood as non-racial requires attention to America’s 
fraught and complex history of race. This history is grounded in 
awareness that from the colonial era through the Civil War, 
slavery constructed the meaning of race in America for more than 
two centuries.21 Slavery was the practice, white supremacy was 
the ideology, and racial stereotypes were the consequence.22 
Slaveholders rationalized that Africans’ natural inferiorities to 
white European colonists rendered them unsuited for liberty and 
in need of the control provided by the institution of slavery,23 an 
institution with staggering economic benefits for the slaveholding 
                                                                                                     
 21. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 17, at 6 (“[T]he Constitution’s references 
to justice, welfare, and liberty were mocked by the treatment meted out 
daily . . . from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries through the courts, 
in legislative statutes, and in those provisions of the Constitution that sanctioned 
[race-based] slavery . . . and allowed disparate treatment for those few blacks 
legally ‘free.’”); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE 
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH i (1956) (“American Negroes still await the full fruition of 
their emancipation—still strive to break what remains of the caste barriers first 
imposed upon them in slavery days.”). 
 22.  
[D]eep faith in white supremacy not only justified an economic and 
political system in which plantation owners acquired land and great 
wealth through the brutality, torture, and coercion of other human 
beings; it also endured, like most articles of faith, long after the 
historical circumstances that gave rise to the religion passed away. 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 26 (2010). 
 23.   
Faith in the idea that people of the African race were bestial, that 
whites were inherently superior, and that slavery was, in fact, for 
blacks’ own good, served to alleviate the white conscience and reconcile 
the tension between slavery and the democratic ideals espoused by 
whites in the so-called New World. 
Id. 
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classes.24 Once the Civil War forced an end to slavery, a need arose 
for other forms of control of the several million newly-freed, 
racially-marked slaves25 who, their former masters feared, might 
revolt against them.26 
When federal efforts to support and protect former slaves 
during the Reconstruction era were brought to a premature halt, 
strictly enforced racial segregation policies and selectively 
enforced law enforcement policies—the era known as Jim Crow—
emerged, providing white majorities with the control they felt they 
needed.27 Stereotypes of black people, especially black men, as 
predatory, dangerous, and naturally inclined toward violence 
served to justify these systematic policies of racial control.28 Once 
racial control policies were established, social conditions of 
segregation and inequality maintained the ideologies of racial 
                                                                                                     
 24. See EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND 
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM xix (2014) (arguing that slavery was a 
“rocket booster” for American economic growth, that it created “massive 
quantities of wealth and treasure” and is implicated in the contemporary story of 
America’s “success, power, and wealth”). 
 25. See, e.g., DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY: PARCHMAN FARM AND 
THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 83 (1996) (describing views of Southern 
penologists at the turn of the century who asserted that Southern white society 
needed strategies for dealing with their “large alien population, an inferior race”). 
 26. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 28 (“Rumors of a great 
insurrection terrified whites, and blacks increasingly came to be viewed as 
menacing and dangerous.”). 
 27. See id. at 30 (“Even among those most hostile to Reconstruction, few 
would have predicted that racial segregation would soon evolve into a new racial 
caste system as stunningly comprehensive and repressive as the one that came to 
be known simply as Jim Crow.”); see also DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY 
ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR 
TO WORLD WAR II 42 (2008) (“[T]he intensity of southern whites’ need to 
reestablish hegemony over blacks rivaled the most visceral patriotism of the 
wartime Confederacy. White southerners initiated an extraordinary campaign of 
defiance and subversion against the new biracial social order imposed on the 
South . . . .”); Michael Fraser, Crime for Crime: Racism and the Death Penalty in 
the American South, 10 SOC. SCI. J. 1, 1 (2011) (“With their system of absolute 
control now gone, Southern whites were forced to utilize another tool to exercise 
oppression: the criminal justice system.”). 
 28. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 28 (“[T]he current stereotypes of black 
men as aggressive, unruly predators can be traced to this period.”); see also PHILIP 
DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA 4–
5 (2002) (describing the “folk pornography” of daily Southern newspapers that 
detailed lurid crimes by blacks to create a “[c]umulative impression . . . of a world 
made precarious by Negroes”). 
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difference, at the same time that ideologies of racial difference 
maintained segregated and unequal social conditions.29 In short, 
the past was not past—it flourished in new forms. 
The rule of law, impartially administered, has long been 
vulnerable to these race ideologies. In the same regions where 
white-on-black racial violence, notably in the form of lynchings, 
was virtually ignored by criminal justice processes,30 
black-on-white violence was punished with special fervor, most 
notably with the death penalty.31 This combination of 
circumstances provides evidence that criminal justice actors were 
using their authority strategically and selectively to reinforce 
cultural norms of racial hierarchy, and assigning the death penalty 
a key role in that racial narrative.32 
                                                                                                     
 29. Convict leasing was a post-Civil War practice rooted in racial separation 
and inequality and designed to reinforce the ideologies of black inferiority that 
perpetuated the practice. See generally BLACKMON, supra note 27 (providing an 
in-depth examination of convict leasing practices in various states). Blackmon 
describes how for decades sheriffs in some Southern states used vagrancy laws to 
take black men into custody and lease them into harsh labor conditions that 
constituted slavery in all but name—“guilty of no crimes and entitled by law to 
freedom, [they] were compelled to labor without compensation, were repeatedly 
bought and sold, and were forced to do the bidding of white masters through the 
regular application of extraordinary physical coercion.” Id. at 2–4. 
 30. See DRAY, supra note 28, at 457 (describing the participation and 
complicity of law enforcement in lynchings of African-Americans, creating a 
system in which “lynch mobs operated with complete impunity”). 
 31. Disproportionate use of the death penalty against African-Americans 
convicted of violence against white victims was especially dramatic for 
non-murder crimes. Until Coker v. Georgia prohibited the death penalty for rape, 
in twelve southern states between 1945–1965, 110 of 119 defendants given death 
sentences for rape convictions were black. See 433 U.S. 584, 584 (1977) (finding 
the death penalty for rape to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment); 
EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 39 (2013) (citing findings from research of criminologist 
Marvin Wolfgang). Dray observes that this pattern of capital punishment links to 
post-Emancipation fears that sexual relationships between black men and white 
women threatened white supremacy through interbreeding. See DRAY, supra note 
28, at 60 (examining anxieties of Southern whites in the post-Emancipation 
period). With or without evidence in support, allegations of sexual assault against 
white women by black men were a common trigger for lynchings, especially 
spectacle lynchings involving sexual mutilation. See id. at 82 (describing spectacle 
lynchings accompanied by sexual mutilation). The frenzy unleashed by these 
allegations is a form of projection, because the rape of black women by white men 
was a central feature of the slave system. See id. at 70 (noting the widespread 
practice of rape of black slave women by white male slaveowners). 
 32. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL 
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These are the post-slavery realities that underlie the empirical 
evidence presented to the Supreme Court in the 1980s in the case 
of McCleskey v. Kemp.33 That evidence, never refuted by the 
Supreme Court, showed race, particularly the race of the victim, to 
be a statistically significant factor in determining who received 
death sentences.34 When the Supreme Court upheld McCleskey’s 
death sentence despite compelling evidence that race was playing 
a major role in selecting who lived and who died at the hands of 
the state, it effectively upheld the role of the death penalty in 
supporting racial hierarchy and gave racial hierarchy a continuing 
role in the state’s infliction of death.35  
McCleskey was a 5–4 opinion that was disavowed by its author 
Justice Powell after his retirement.36 So its conclusion, its 
implications, and the ideas it embodies are sharply contested. 
These are reminders—befitting a symposium in a Law Review 
bearing the names of Washington and Lee—that in many ways the 
ghosts of the colonial and antebellum slave system continue to 
                                                                                                     
PUNISHMENT 97 (2003) (providing statistical support for the conclusion that 
“lynching history predicts modern executions”). 
 33. See 481 U.S. 279, 313, 316–320 (1987) (holding that a study showing 
statistically significant race-of-victim disparities in the imposition of the death 
penalty did not prove discrimination in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
 34. Using regression analyses in an effort to isolate the role that race may 
have played in capital sentencing from the role that more than two hundred 
legitimate factors may have played, Iowa law professor David Baldus and his 
research team concluded that killing a white victim proved as significant an 
explanatory factor in who received death sentences as having a prior murder 
conviction. See DAVID BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., 
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 147 
(1990) (analyzing the factors that contribute to an individual’s likelihood of 
receiving a death sentence). 
 35. Writing for the majority in McCleskey, Justice Powell observed that 
while there is “some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury’s decision,” the 
Baldus study did not demonstrate a constitutionally unacceptable risk of “racial 
prejudice influencing capital sentencing decisions.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308–
09. Edward Lazarus, a Supreme Court clerk from the McCleskey era, asserts that 
Powell’s inability to uphold McCleskey’s claims was derived from Powell’s need to 
believe in the “myth of southern progress,” the notion that “the South had 
achieved a dramatic reformation on matters of race.” EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED 
CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 200 
(1998). 
 36. See JOHN C, JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451–52 (1994) 
(describing Justice Powell’s reversal of views on McCleskey). 
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inhabit our cultural contests. Since the late nineteenth century, 
America has been at war with itself, deeply divided on whether and 
how to challenge racial hierarchy and on the role law should play 
in supporting or mitigating the racial hierarchy that became 
embedded in American culture through its slave system.37 As 
recent events illustrate, questions about whether and how black 
lives matter are still haunting us, as they have for centuries.38 The 
legal and ideological battles that undergird drug laws, stop and 
frisk policies, police shootings, presidential campaigns, and most 
certainly the death penalty, remain volatile and unresolved.39 
As coercive institutions empowered to keep people in bondage, 
state criminal justice systems have long been key sites for these 
ideological and legal battles.40 The Fourteenth Amendment, part 
                                                                                                     
 37. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 20–57 (describing how disruptions in 
hierarchical racial structures of society—such as the abolition of slavery, demise 
of Jim Crow, and the accomplishments of the civil rights movement—have led to 
successful efforts to exploit racial resentments of poor and working-class whites 
and to install new systems of racial control).  
 38. In 2012, after numerous publicized deaths of African-Americans by white 
police and the widespread failure to hold police accountable, the 
#BlackLivesMatter movement was formed. About the Black Lives Matter 
Movement, BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited 
June 7, 2016) (discussing the history of the organization) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The mission of the movement is to broaden 
“the conversation around state violence to include all of the ways in which Black 
people are intentionally left powerless at the hands of the state. We are talking 
about the ways in which Black lives are deprived of our basic human rights and 
dignity.” Id. 
 39. See DRAY, supra note 28, at xi (“Is it possible for white America to really 
understand blacks’ distrust of the legal system, their fears of racial profiling and 
the police, without understanding how cheap a black life was for so long a time in 
our nation’s history?”). Observers of American culture often note its distinctive 
racial history and the way that history continues to pervade America’s social and 
political structure. See PETER BALDWIN, THE NARCISSISM OF MINOR DIFFERENCES: 
HOW AMERICA AND EUROPE ARE ALIKE 226 (2009) (claiming that the most 
significant distinction between America and Europe “is not a grand opposition of 
worldviews or ideologies . . . [i]t is the still unresolved legacy of slavery and its 
tragic modern consequence of a . . . racially identifiable underclass”). 
 40. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 13 (“Like Jim Crow (and slavery), mass 
incarceration operates as a tightly networked system of laws, policies, customs, 
and institutions that operate collectively to ensure the subordinate status of a 
group defined largely by race.”); OSHINSKY, supra note 25, at 32–33 (describing 
perception of white Southerners that post-Civil War law enforcement meant 
“keeping the ex-slaves in line”); Fraser, supra note 27, at 1 (“With their system of 
absolute control now gone, Southern whites were forced to utilize another tool to 
exercise oppression: the criminal justice system.”). 
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of the package of Reconstruction Amendments that followed soon 
after the end of the Civil War, imposed the first explicit 
constitutional limits on the power of states, because one outgrowth 
of the Civil War was an awareness that tyranny could come not 
just from a centralized federal power but also from decentralized 
state authorities.41 Questions of federalism— the appropriate 
balance between federal and state power— continue to live in this 
battleground, shaped by a cataclysmic conflict about the meaning 
of race in America.42  
The story of Criminal Procedure—the constitutional 
regulation of law enforcement processes and a course taught in 
every law school—is one of the federalism stories that emerged 
from the Civil War and carried forward its preoccupations with 
race.43 The Scottsboro cases, capital cases involving nine black 
male teenage defendants falsely accused yet sentenced to death for 
the rape of two white women, exposed the role of state criminal 
justice and death penalty systems in perpetuating racial 
stereotypes and racial subordination by state violence.44 The 
notoriety of criminal justice scandals like these provoked quests to 
find federal mechanisms that might limit states’ racialized, and 
sometimes lethal, abuses of criminal justice processes.45  
                                                                                                     
 41. See GARRETT EPPS, AMERICAN EPIC: READING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 169 
(“[T]he new nation that emerged from the Civil War could not exist as a 
self-governing, democratic republic without strong federal monitoring of 
individual rights.”).  
 42. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 26 (“Federalism—the division of power 
between the states and the federal government—was the device employed to 
protect the institution of slavery and the political power of the slaveholding 
states.”); id. at 25 (“The Southern slaveholding colonies would agree to form a 
union only on the condition that the federal government would not be able to 
interfere with the right to own slaves.”). 
 43. See LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 85 (describing the constitutional history 
of Criminal Procedure as “forc[ing] state law enforcement officials to observe 
federal constitutional standards” to combat notorious racialized abuses of state 
criminal justice processes).  
 44. For gripping narratives of the Scottsboro case and the racial dynamics 
that pervaded it, see generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE 
AMERICAN SOUTH (1969); JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994).  
 45. See LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 85 (“Scottsboro was a potent symbol of 
what could go wrong locally in the American judicial system and a spur to both 
those who would expunge bigotry from the system and those seeking to enforce 
national standards of justice upon the states.”). 
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Reconstruction’s Fourteenth Amendment was one of the 
limiting mechanisms, a weapon in the fight to disentangle state 
criminal justice and racial ideology.46 Through its limits on state 
power, the criminal justice protections contained in the federal Bill 
of Rights were incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment 
as limits on the actions of state authorities.47 The Supreme Court 
first applied the incorporation doctrine to reverse a state’s criminal 
conviction in the Scottsboro cases, launching the broad 
constitutionalization of Criminal Procedure.48 Succinctly stated, 
incorporation was a post-Reconstruction tool for reinforcing the 
rule of law and curbing the worst racial abuses of state criminal 
justice systems.49 The expansion of federal habeas corpus remedies 
was another approach to the same problem, providing greater 
access to federal court review of state criminal justice actions.50 
The incorporation doctrine, the constitutionalization of 
Criminal Procedure, and habeas corpus remedies are ostensibly 
race-neutral legal mechanisms. Debates about their scope are often 
devoid of explicitly racial content.51 But all of these legal 
mechanisms were born of America’s deep-seated racial conflicts. 
When we recall their racial history, we can see more clearly the 
                                                                                                     
 46. See EPPS, supra note 41, at 166–69 (arguing that one of the meanings of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, drafted to make sure that the newly freed slaves 
obtained full rights of citizenship, was that “states must respect the same limits 
as the federal government when they deal with any American citizen.”). 
 47. See id. at 169 (explaining that the post-Civil War need for federal 
monitoring of state protection of individual rights led to courts finding individual 
rights “incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 48. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (reversing the Scottsboro 
convictions by incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as binding on 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 49. See LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 85 (“The blood of the Scottsboro cases 
courses through all these [Supreme Court] decisions [protecting the procedural 
rights of criminal defendants].”). 
 50. See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF 
LIBERTY 1 (2001) (“Attempts to extend the range and efficacy of the writ 
have . . . been inseparably connected for centuries with attempts to secure justice 
for those who at any particular moment find themselves execrated by the 
dominant forces in society.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal 
Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1554 (2011) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s 
race-neutral discussion of Fourth Amendment doctrine and its avoidance of facts 
identifying the race of the parties and relevant actors when deciding Criminal 
Procedure cases).  
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pervasive racial influences on the contours of our contemporary 
criminal justice systems. And when we view these systems now, 
we can begin to appreciate that they look the way they do because 
of a significant cultural dynamic: longstanding racialized uses of 
state criminal justice systems and fairly recent multifaceted efforts 
to limit their racialized uses, followed by the pushback against 
those limiting efforts that has gathered force in recent decades.52 
B. Understanding Race in the Giarratano Case 
This brief description of the history of the many and varied 
efforts to recapture state criminal justice systems from racialized 
uses helps us to understand some of the ways that Joseph 
Giarratano’s case was shaped by race. To one degree or another, 
every criminal case has been shaped by race. Our criminal justice 
system was forged in America’s racial cauldron and would not look 
as it does but for our racial history. The constitutional arguments 
that Giarratano framed in his jail cell, his access to the federal 
courts to review Virginia court actions, the legal doctrines that 
offered promise of relief but ultimately constrained his remedies, 
are a product of the ongoing battle of ideologies that are, not 
exclusively but in significant part, an inheritance of our racial past 
and a continuing mold for our legal system’s future. 
Moreover, Giarratano’s was a death penalty case, and as much 
or more than any other practice, America’s capital punishment 
system was forged in its racial cauldron.53 When the end of slavery 
removed the value of black lives as property, it enhanced the risk 
                                                                                                     
 52. See History of Racism and Immigration Timeline, RACIAL EQUITY TOOLS, 
http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/9780415892940/data/8%20history% 
20and%20immigration%20timeline.pdf (depicting the history of racial equity in 
America as including centuries of African-American oppression followed by a 
relatively brief period of civil rights advances, then subsequent decades of 
retrenchment). 
 53. See Bryan Stevenson, Close to Death: Reflections on Race and Capital 
Punishment in America, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? THE EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR BEST CASE 93 
(Hugo Bedau & Paul Cassell eds., 2004) (“[T]he struggles over capital punishment 
in America have been fought from trenches that were dug in other, fateful 
conflicts in the nation’s history—conflicts about slavery, about Southern culture, 
about state and federal powers, about race relations . . . .”) (citing David Garland, 
Judicial Lightning, THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (Oct. 25, 2002)). 
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of having black lives taken, as one author noted, by “white mobs 
and white courts.”54 Most lynching victims were African-
American,55 such that lynching was understood as a practice of 
racial violence staged publicly to bolster white supremacist 
norms.56 When Southern states turned away from lynching in the 
twentieth century, whether due to fear of federal anti-lynching 
legislation or otherwise,57 we can find examples of officials calling 
off would-be lynch mobs by implicitly promising capital 
punishment as law’s alternative route to a parallel outcome.58 A 
recent empirical study by researcher Franklin Zimring reports 
that, without exception, the states with the most extensive 
lynching histories, including Virginia, now use the death penalty 
and “collectively dominate the nation’s execution totals.”59 
Although Giarratano is white, Virginia’s attachment to the death 
penalty that was imposed on him is part of a racial pattern, a 
legacy rooted in its racial past.  
                                                                                                     
 54. OSHINSKY, supra note 25, at 29. 
 55. See ZIMRING, supra note 32, at 90 (analyzing data showing that “[t]he 
victims of lynching were overwhelmingly African American”). 
 56. See DRAY, supra note 28, at xi (describing lynching as a system of terror 
used to “maintain power whites had over blacks, a way to keep blacks fearful and 
to forestall black progress and miscegenation” and “a constant source of 
intimidation to all black Southerners young and old and a daily reminder of their 
defenselessness”). 
 57. Some scholars suggest that in the early twentieth century fear of anti-
lynching legislation led Southern states to turn away from lynching. See, e.g., 
MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 21 (1987) (discussing 
potential causes for the decline of lynching).  
 58. The term “legal lynching” began to be used to refer to capital trials of 
blacks for crimes against whites. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 44, at 115 
(“[O]fficials begged would-be-lynchers to ‘let the law take its course,’ thus tacitly 
promising that there would be a quick trial and the death penalty.”); GOODMAN, 
supra note 44, at 26 (describing, in a chapter entitled “Legal Lynching,” the view 
that the hypocritical use of legal procedure to deny rights in the courtroom then 
impose a death sentence resembled the practice of lynching, such that “the façade 
of judge and jury would replace the rope . . . .”). 
 59. ZIMRING, supra note 32, at 96. 
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1. Departure and Return of the Death Penalty 
There is yet more evidence of the racial pedigree of the death 
penalty in America. Furman v. Georgia,60 the 1972 U.S. Supreme 
Court case that temporarily halted America’s death penalty, was 
brought to the Supreme Court by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 
a legal organization founded by Thurgood Marshall and dedicated 
to the advancement of civil rights and racial justice.61 Those in the 
contemporary movement to abolish the death penalty are known 
as abolitionists, a racial justice echo that voices its link with the 
abolitionist movement of the nineteenth century that sought to end 
slavery.62 As Evan Mandery writes in A Wild Justice, his book 
about the Furman case, “everyone understood Furman to have 
been about race.”63 Four years later, when the Supreme Court 
reinstated the death penalty in the 1976 case of Gregg v. Georgia,64 
it was clear that this retrenchment was tied to backlash against 
the civil rights movement and the civil rights advances that it had 
precipitated.65 This backlash expressed itself in a racially charged 
tough-on-crime movement.66 But for the resentment of civil rights 
                                                                                                     
 60. See 408 U.S. 238, 229–30 (1972) (holding that state death penalty 
statutes which allowed the arbitrary imposition of capital sentences constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment). 
 61. See MANDERY, supra note 31, at 31–35 (describing how and why the Legal 
Defense Fund put the death penalty on its litigation agenda). 
 62. See, e.g., Diann Rust-Tierney, We, Too, Are Abolitionists: Black History 
Month, Slavery and the Death Penalty, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diann-rusttierney/we-too-are-abolitionists_b_168 
386.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (exploring connections between the two 
abolitionist movements and describing the death penalty as an “outdated legacy 
of slavery”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 63. MANDERY, supra note 31, at 276; see also id. at 266 (“Why was the public 
so angry with the Supreme Court about Furman? . . . The most significant context 
is race.”). 
 64. See 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (finding state death penalty statutes 
consistent with Eighth Amendment standards due to their procedures for guiding 
jurors’ discretion in issuing death sentences). 
 65. See MANDERY, supra note 31, at 275–76 (asserting that “the public’s 
antipathy” for the Supreme Court’s decisions on race and social issues was 
“expressed in the campaign to revive capital punishment” because Furman’s 
vulnerability—a 5–4 decision with nine separate opinions followed by personnel 
changes on the Court—signaled that the campaign could succeed). 
 66. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 40 (“Proponents of racial hierarchy 
found they could install a new racial caste system without violating the law or the 
new limits of acceptable political discourse, by demanding ‘law and order’ rather 
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progress that led to restoration of capital punishment, the death 
penalty would have been unavailable to the Virginia courts that 
imposed it on Joe Giarratano in 1979.67 Long after its abolition in 
most Western democracies, the death penalty survived in America, 
a relic of America’s centuries-old and still highly charged racial 
dynamics.68  
2. Executive Clemency 
Despite the death sentence that he received and the proximity 
to execution that he experienced, the fact that Joe Giarratano no 
longer lives under the official threat of death may have a racial 
aspect as well. Based on a review of the facts of the case and 
questions about guilt, Giarratano was granted a conditional 
pardon and a commutation of sentence—from death to life with 
parole—by Governor Douglas Wilder, who indicated that the 
state’s attorney general should consider granting Giarratano a 
retrial.69 If a retrial were granted, its outcome would prevail over 
                                                                                                     
than ‘segregation forever.’”); MANDERY, supra note 31, at 271–74 (describing 
Nixon’s decision to manipulate racialized law and order rhetoric for partisan 
reasons—appealing to the racial hostilities of white Southern voters). 
 67. See MANDERY, supra note 31, at 274 (“The justices [had been] agents of 
unwanted social change, and through their decisions on busing and capital 
punishment had sought to aid and protect a population that whites regarded as 
dangerous and undesirable.”). 
 68. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN 
AN AGE OF ABOLITION 11 (2010) (“What was once a familiar moral debate has been 
reborn as a sociological and historical problem: how to explain the peculiarities of 
America’s twenty-first century death penalty? . . . [America] continue[s] to use 
capital punishment at a time when all other Western democracies have decisively 
abandoned it.”); see also ZIMRING, supra note 32, at 5–6 (“Alone among the 
Western democracies, state governments in the United States authorize and 
conduct executions as criminal punishment . . . .”). Most of the executions in the 
United States since 1976 have taken place in the South. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING 
& GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 31, 128–30 
(1986) (reviewing America’s execution statistics and concluding that “[a]t first 
sight, so striking is the contrast between the South and the other regions that the 
South appears to be ‘another country’”). 
 69. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Virginia Governor Blocks an Execution, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 20, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/20/us/virginia-governor-
blocks-an-execution.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (reporting Wilder’s commutation 
of Giarratano’s death sentence) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
John F. Harris, Wilder Grants Reversal of Death Sentence, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 
1991), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/02/20/wilder-grants-
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the sentence remaining from the conditional pardon.70 Because the 
prosecutor’s office with authority to provide a retrial never 
permitted it and the Parole Board has yet to grant parole, 
Giarratano remains incarcerated.71  
Although Governor Wilder expressed support for the death 
penalty as Virginia governor72 and refused clemency in other 
cases,73 it is not unthinkable that his perspective as the grandson 
of slaves, the namesake of Frederick Douglass, and a child of 
segregation, then the first African-American elected to statewide 
office in Virginia and the first African-American governor in the 
country,74 influenced his willingness to entertain skepticism about 
                                                                                                     
reversal-of-death-sentence/e26bf0dd-523b-4445-9e2e-b8726c6f03b5/ (last visited Oct. 
4, 2016) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Pamela 
Overstreet, Wilder Grants Conditional Pardon, UPI (Feb. 19, 1991), 
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/02/19/Wilder-grants-conditionalpardon/53306669 
39600/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 70. See Walter A. McFarlane, The Clemency Process in Virginia, 27 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 241, 247 (1992) (describing the limits on the Governor’s authority that 
required Giarratano’s conditional pardon to be structured as it was). 
 71. See John F. Harris, Terry Rules Out New Trial for Pardoned Killer: 
Attorney General Certain of Giarratano’s Guilt, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 1991), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1991/02/21/terry-rules-out-new-
trial-for-pardoned-killer/f123b9b6-5216-49a1-9602-b16581d555ce/ (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2016) (examining Giarratano’s request for a new trial) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Although his life sentence renders him parole 
eligible, the parole board has denied Giarratano’s previous requests for parole 
based primarily on the seriousness of the underlying crime. See Joseph 
Giarratano, Joe’s Blog #12—The Virginia Parole Board’s Decision, FREE JOE 
GIARRATANO (Apr. 29, 2014), http://freejoeg.com/joes-blog-12-virginia-parole-
boards-decision/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (stating the parole board’s reasons for 
rejecting his parole requests) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 72. See L. DOUGLAS WILDER, SON OF VIRGINIA: A LIFE IN AMERICA’S POLITICAL 
ARENA 134 (2015) (“I had campaigned [for governor] on a strong law-and-order 
platform, including supporting the death penalty . . . .”). 
 73. See Harris, supra note 69 (stating that Governor Wilder “has refused 
three other pleas for clemency from condemned murderers during his 13 months 
in office”).  
 74. In his memoir, Wilder describes the effects of segregation on his life and 
his political career, his involvement in civil rights activities, and his view that the 
justice system was “stained by segregation.” Wilder, supra note 72, at 46–47. 
Wilder was an admirer and associate of Spottswood Robinson, a high-profile 
Virginia civil rights lawyer. Id. When Robinson became dean of the law school at 
Howard University, Thurgood Marshall appointed Wilder to succeed Robinson as 
a registered agent for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, enabling Wilder to meet 
civil rights lawyers from all over the country and to be “involved in some of the 
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the accuracy of Giarratano’s conviction,75 despite political pressure 
to allow his execution to proceed.76 Growing up in a segregated 
black community, educated in segregated schools and a historically 
black college, attending Howard Law School where civil rights 
litigation was invented by professors like Charles Hamilton 
Houston and students like Thurgood Marshall—both of whom 
pursued a legal campaign to dismantle segregation as lawyers at 
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund—and having extensive 
experience as a criminal trial lawyer, Wilder undoubtedly 
encountered many stories of wrongful convictions and executions 
of innocents, given the racialized context that made these 
narratives especially prevalent among African-Americans.77 
                                                                                                     
great civil rights cases of the day.” Id.  
 75. See id. at 47 (describing his role in “representing those who were in 
danger of being left outside the system of justice unless I helped them”). 
 76. Because Giarratano had numerous supporters, Wilder experienced 
political pressure both to grant and to deny clemency to Giarratano. See Ayres, 
supra note 69 (“Under intense pressure from both conservatives and liberals, Gov. 
L. Douglas Wilder of Virginia decided today to spare the life of Joseph M. 
Giarratano . . . .”). Typically, politicians in death penalty jurisdictions assess 
their political risks as greater in granting clemency than in denying it. See, e.g., 
Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding 
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.L. REV. 
760, 774 (1995) (“[F]rom California to Texas to Florida, candidates for governor 
sound as if they’re running to be executioner.”) (quoting Bob Minzesheimer, 
Executioner’s Song Heard in Governor Races, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 1994, at 9A). 
Indeed, news reports implied that the decision of Virginia’s Attorney General to 
refuse Giarratano a new trial was politically motivated. See Harris, supra note 69 
(observing that Attorney General Terry was expected to run for Virginia governor 
in 1993). The widespread perception that governors—such as Governor George 
W. Bush of Texas—deny clemency based on a self-serving political calculus 
explains an editorial cartoon that appeared in The Boston Globe in 2000, depicting 
a Texas inmate being put to death by lethal injection as a Texas corrections 
official explains to him: “Sorry—no reprieve . . . the Governor’s campaign needs a 
shot in the arm.” Wasserman’s View, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 2000, at A24. 
 77. Governor Wilder describes the inequalities he experienced growing up in 
racially segregated Virginia and expresses admiration for civil rights lawyers and 
the movement to end segregation. See WILDER, supra note 72, at 40–47 (describing 
the need for, and the role of lawyers in, efforts to dismantle segregation). Noting 
that he had been a criminal trial lawyer for many years, id. at 134, Wilder 
indicates that he saw himself making a contribution to civil rights “chiefly by 
representing African American folks in the courts.” Id. at 45. He observes that 
many of his cases “were not about race per se but race was often the underlying 
issue.” Id. at 47. 
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3. Juries 
Where narratives like these have remained especially 
prevalent among African-Americans in our still largely segregated 
communities, the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from 
juries has disproportionately excluded many whose backgrounds 
have generated an openness to considering the possibility of official 
error.78 Through the combined operation of jury eligibility laws79 
                                                                                                     
 78. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We 
Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and 
Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1019–20 (2003) (reviewing social science 
research suggesting that, relative to white jurors, black jurors are more skeptical 
about “the fairness of the legal system” and that “many Blacks are socialized in 
environments that are mistrustful of the egalitarian claims of White America”). 
In the state of Virginia, a 2009 poll conducted by The Washington Post showed 
that while seventy-two percent of white Virginians supported the death penalty, 
fifty-six percent of African Americans living in Virginia opposed it. See Jennifer 
Agiesta, On Eve of Execution, Virginians Broadly Support Death Penalty, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 9, 2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/ 
2009/11/on_eve_of_execution_ virginians.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (reporting 
differential levels of death penalty support by race) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 79. Criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to a jury drawn from a 
pool representative of the community. See generally Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 
522, 537 (1975). However, because jury pools are commonly drawn from voter lists 
and, for a variety of converging reasons, voter lists disproportionately exclude 
African-Americans, jury pools typically underrepresent African-Americans. See 
Cynthia A. Williams, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter 
Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U.L. REV. 590, 626 (1990) (describing the inaccuracy in 
census and voter registration data that “results in the systematic 
underrepresentation of distinctive groups of the community in jury pools”); see 
also Stevenson, supra note 53, at 90 (“In several Alabama counties, over a quarter 
of the African American population is illegally underrepresented on the list of 
prospective jurors.”).  
Of course, criminal justice policies that disproportionately convict and 
incarcerate African-Americans, then attach voting disabilities to felony 
convictions, will systematically reduce African-Americans’ eligibility for jury 
service. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 17 (“Like Jim Crow, mass 
incarceration . . . authorizes discrimination against [large segments of the 
African American community] in voting, employment, housing, education, public 
benefits, and jury service.”). As Alexander observes, “Felon disenfranchisement 
laws have been more effective in eliminating black voters in the age of mass 
incarceration than they were during Jim Crow.” Id. at 187–88. She further notes 
that “a large percentage of black men (about 30 percent) are automatically 
excluded from jury service because they have been labeled felons.” Id. at 189; see 
also Adam Liptak, Exclusion of Blacks from Juries Raises Renewed Scrutiny, 
N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/17 
/us/politics/exclusion-of-blacks-from-juries-raises-renewed-scrutiny.html?_r=0 
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and jury selection practices—such as those that permit prosecutors 
to peremptorily strike African-Americans from juries as long as, if 
challenged later, they can articulate race-neutral reasons for the 
strikes80—in many communities juries rarely contain more than a 
token number of African-Americans, if any.81 Because jurors are 
                                                                                                     
(last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (“Blacks may be less likely to be on jury lists that are 
drawn from voter registration records, less likely to appear when called, more 
likely to qualify for hardship exemptions and more likely to be disqualified for 
felony convictions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 80. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (shifting the burden to 
the prosecutor to offer race-neutral explanations for peremptory challenges after 
the defendant makes a prima facie showing of discrimination in the prosecutor’s 
use of  challenges). Batson has proven ineffective in preventing race-based 
peremptory challenges to jurors. See Hilary Weddell, A Jury of Whose Peers?: 
Eliminating Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection Procedures, 33 B.C.J.L. & 
SOC. JUST. 453, 478 (2013) (“[P]eremptory challenges continue to be used 
seemingly on race alone, and the current construction of the Batson challenge 
does little to curb this use.”). This is so even after the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Foster v. Chatman. See 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) (holding 
prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be pretextual only because of the 
subsequent disclosure of his notes showing that he consciously struck all of the 
eligible black jurors on the basis of race in the trial of a black Georgia teenager 
for the murder of an elderly white woman). See Phyllis Goldfarb, Response, Foster 
v. Chatman: E-Racing the White Jury’s Constitutional Veneer, GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
ON DOCKET (May 29, 2016), http://www.gwlr.org/foster-v-chatman-e-racing-the-
white-jurys-constitutional-veneer-examining-what-lies-beneath/ (last visited Oct. 
4, 2016) (observing that “were it not for the belated revelations in the prosecutor’s 
notes, Foster’s Batson challenge would have continued to fall short”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81. A recent study compiled the following evidence of the widespread 
exclusion of African Americans from jury service:  
From 2005 to 2009, in cases where the death penalty has been imposed, 
prosecutors in Houston County, Alabama have used peremptory 
strikes to remove 80% of the African Americans qualified for jury 
service. As a result, half of these juries were all-white and the 
remainder had only a single black member, despite the fact that 
Houston County is 27% African-American.  
In 2003, the Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center found that 
prosecutors in Jefferson Parish felony cases strike African-American 
prospective jurors at more than three times the rate that they strike 
white prospective jurors. Louisiana allows convictions . . . even if only 
10 of 12 jurors believe the defendant is guilty. The high rate of 
exclusion means that in 80% of criminal trials, there is no effective 
black representation on the jury because only the votes of white jurors 
are necessary to convict, even though Jefferson Parish is 23% black. 
In the years before and after Batson, Georgia prosecutors in the 
Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit used 83% of their peremptory strikes 
against African Americans, who make up 34% of the circuit’s 
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not representative of the regions from which they are drawn, their 
views may not be representative.82 In capital cases, the process of 
“death-qualifying” a jury—by removing all the jurors with 
conscientious scruples about the death penalty83—will exacerbate 
the problem, as the accumulated lessons of the lives of people of 
color make them disproportionately disinclined toward death 
sentences and thereby ineligible to sit as capital jurors, even in the 
guilt-innocence phase of capital trials.84  
                                                                                                     
population.  
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A 
CONTINUING LEGACY 14 (2010), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-
discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [hereinafter EJI REPORT]. The EJI Report 
recounts numerous stories of African-American citizens, descendants of slaves 
and some of them survivors of Jim Crow, who have lived in a single county for 
their entire lives and have never been called for jury duty, or who have been called 
but struck from the jury for so-called race-neutral reasons that also applied to 
whites permitted to serve as jurors. See id. at 16–35 (describing the impact of 
race-based jury selection on the African-American community). 
 82. See Lynch & Haney, supra note 19, at 580 (examining studies that “have 
found that race of the juror can matter in capital case outcomes”).  
 83. “Death qualification” refers to the practice of removing from a capital 
jury, prior to trial, people who hold moral qualms about the death penalty. See 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (upholding the exclusion of jurors 
removed for cause after expressing with less than “unmistakable clarity” concerns 
about the death penalty that were deemed to prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of their duties). The Wainwright standard for “death-qualifying” a 
jury is broader than the original death qualification standard articulated in 
Witherspoon v. Illinois. See 391 U.S. 510, 529–531 (1968) (reversing a death 
sentence imposed by a jury from which people had been excluded after voir dire 
for voicing conscientious scruples against infliction of the death penalty); see also 
Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement 
and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1463 (1997) (“Death-
qualified juries are less likely to share the racial and status characteristics or the 
common life experiences with capital defendants that would otherwise enable 
them to bridge the vast differences in behavior the trial is designed to highlight.”). 
 84. A recent Gallup poll found that twenty-nine percent of white respondents 
opposed the death penalty, compared to fifty-five percent opposition among black 
respondents. See Andrew Dugan, Solid Majority Continue to Support Death 
Penalty, GALLUP (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/186218/solid-
majority-continue-support-death-penalty.aspx?g_source=solid%20 majority%20 
continue%20to%20support%20death%20penalty&g_medium=search&g_campai
gn=tiles (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (comparing differential levels by race in support 
for the death penalty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 26, 45–47 (2000) (reporting data showing that white jurors expressed more 
anger toward defendants than black jurors did, regardless of the defendant’s race, 
and that black jurors were better able than white jurors to empathize with both 
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In other words, regardless of the race of the defendant, the 
systematic and rampant exclusion of African-Americans from 
juries skews fact-finding in the direction of more convictions and 
death sentences.85 These realities can influence other aspects of 
the process. For example, even when there are legitimate defenses, 
the possibility of actual innocence, or questions about the degree of 
guilt, defendants understandably bent on escaping the possibility 
of a death sentence may choose to plead guilty to obtain a sentence 
less than death.86 The pressure to do so will only increase where 
the defendant’s sense of the jury is that selection processes have 
skewed it toward a conviction and death sentence.  
While issues surrounding jury composition play a role in an 
overall analysis of the continuing pervasive effects of racial 
dynamics on criminal justice processes, they do not play a role in 
the Giarratano case. In what we now understand to be a decision-
                                                                                                     
black and white defendants and to “keep the sin separate from the sinner”); Adam 
Liptak, Facing a Jury of (Some of) One’s Peers, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/20/weekinreview/20 LIPT.html (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2016) (“‘There is a major bleaching of juries,’ said Samuel R. Gross, a law 
professor at the University of Michigan. ‘Many more African-Americans are 
excluded than whites. The biggest demographic predictor of attitudes toward the 
death penalty is race.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lynch 
& Haney, supra note 19, at 589 (“[R]acial animus is one of the most consistent 
and robust predictors of support for the death penalty.”) (quoting James D. 
Unnever, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Race, Racism and Support for 
Capital Punishment, 37 CRIME & JUST. 45, 69 (2008)).  
 85. The death qualification of jurors prior to a capital trial removes jurors 
who oppose the death penalty not just from the sentencing phase of the trial, but 
from the guilt-innocence phase as well. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying 
text (providing explanation of the “death qualification” process). Yet studies show 
“a powerful correlation between attitudes toward the death penalty and 
receptiveness to evidence of defendant’s guilt.” Liptak, supra note 84. See also 
Richard Morin, Bias in the Jury Box?, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2004), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2004/03/21/bias-in-the-jury-
box/c1bdc75a-879f-4a24-a21f-08a5c2d67387/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) 
(describing research that shows death-qualified juries are more conviction-prone) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In Lockhart v. McCree, the 
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to death qualification prior to trial that was 
based on research showing that death-qualified juries were more conviction-
prone. See generally 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
 86. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions are 
Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFFALO L. REV. 469, 488 (1996) (reporting a study 
that showed sixteen homicide exonerees had pled guilty and that they explicitly 
noted a fear of execution as the reason that they chose to plead guilty, despite 
their innocence). 
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making process motivated by a suicidal aim, Joe Giarratano 
waived his right to a jury when he was tried for murder.87 Aware 
of gaps in his memory, addled by years of severe substance abuse, 
and believing that he may have committed murder, Giarratano 
thought he deserved to die.88 Refusing to plead to eliminate the 
prospect of the death penalty, Giarratano chose a bench trial to 
fulfill his suicide mission.89 With the help of his appointed defense 
counsel, he waived a jury, presented an unsupported defense at 
trial, obtained a conviction, and asked the judge for a death 
sentence.90 As events confirmed, Giarratano had correctly 
identified the most efficient route to assisted suicide. 
4. Judges 
Of course, the judge had to play his expected role in the suicide 
plan. Knowing that Giarratano had declined to accept a plea to 
avoid the death penalty then waived his right to a jury trial,91 
knowing that Giarratano had suffered abuse in an unstable home 
as a child and that he turned to drug and alcohol abuse starting at 
age eleven,92 knowing that Giarratano had attempted to take his 
own life multiple times and was being administered psychotropic 
drugs during trial,93 the judge might have decided that, despite 
Giarratano’s request for death, an appropriate sentence in these 
circumstances was life in prison.94 Although the judge was 
                                                                                                     
 87. See In re Joseph M. Giarratano, Petition for Conditional Pardon by the 
Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia 3 (1991), http://freejoeg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/07_S_Exhibits_Volume_SIX_of_SEVEN.pdf 
[hereinafter 1991 Petition] (explaining Giarratano’s decision to waive his right to 
a jury). 
 88. Id. at 2–9. 
 89. Id. at 2–3. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Testimony at the sentencing hearing provided the judge with this 
information. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 100–102 (Va. 
1980) (describing testimony at the sentencing hearing on Giarratano’s childhood). 
 93. Id.  
 94. In a companion case to Gregg v. Georgia, Woodson v. North Carolina 
rejected the imposition of an automatic death sentence for a specified offense. See 
Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (“[O]ne of the most significant developments 
in our society’s treatment of capital punishment has been the rejection of the 
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required under law to make an independent moral judgment as to 
whether the circumstances of Giarratano’s life reduced his 
culpability and made the death penalty excessive in his case, 
Giarratano presumed that the judge would oblige his request to 
receive a death sentence.95 Why was this a safe wager?  
The selection process for state trial court judges reinforced the 
likelihood that the judge would deliver the death sentence that 
Giarratano sought.96 In states that have relied on the death 
penalty to the greatest extent—states of the old Confederacy97—
judges are elected.98 State judges typically serve for a term of 
years, then stand for re-election against potential opponents, or 
survive a retention election, to continue to serve.99 In states where 
                                                                                                     
common-law practice of inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every person 
convicted of a specified offense.”). 
 95. See id. at 304 (“[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense 
as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of 
death.”). In Giarratano’s case, the trial judge found that at the time of the offense 
the defendant was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or 
to conform his conduct with the law, was not significantly impaired. See 
Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 102–03 (Va. 1980) (analyzing 
Giarratano’s mental state at the time of the offenses for which he was convicted). 
Although these were factors expressly identified in the Virginia mitigation 
statute, the statute also clarifies—consistent with constitutional requirements—
that mitigation cannot be limited to the identified factors. See VA. CODE § 19.2-
264.4 (2010) (outlining sentencing proceedings in Virginia). 
 96. Justice Stevens recognized this reality in his dissent in Harris v. 
Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521 (1995) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“[G]iven the political 
pressures they face, judges are far more likely than juries to impose the death 
penalty. This has long been the case . . . .”). 
 97. As of April 7, 2016, 1167 of 1433 executions in the United States since 
1976 have taken place in the South, more than eighty-one percent of all 
executions in the post-Gregg era. Number of Executions by State and Region Since 
1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. org/number-
executions-state-and-region-1976 (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 98. Virtually all states that have the death penalty, and all Southern states, 
subject state judges to elections. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 76, at 776–80 
(detailing judicial election procedures across the country).  
 99. Four-year and six-year judicial terms are most common in states that 
require judges to face elections. See id. at 777–78 n.85–87 (listing state statutes 
and constitutional provisions establishing judicial terms and elections). The 
states that rely most on the death penalty are the states that select judges 
through contested elections. Id. at 777 n.85. Judges often tout their death penalty 
1420 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395 (2016) 
the death penalty is popular, judges are under political pressure to 
impose and support death sentences where they can.100 Those who 
fail to do so when opportunities arise are vulnerable to ugly re-
election campaigns, and potential rejection, in the next election 
cycle.101  
Political pressure to impose death sentences in states with 
considerable support for the death penalty may remain acute in 
Virginia, where trial court judges are elected by the Virginia 
General Assembly rather than by the voting populace.102 In this 
unusual selection procedure, voting legislators may be concerned 
about their own reelection to the Virginia state legislature and will 
be inclined to make safe judicial choices that pose limited risk to 
their reelection prospects.103 Because judicial choices reflect 
                                                                                                     
rulings during their electoral campaigns. See id. at 787 (“Incumbent judges have 
used capital cases to advance their chances of reelection or retention.”).  
 100. See id. at 765 (“[T]hese political pressures have a significant impact on 
the fairness and integrity of capital trials. When presiding over a highly 
publicized capital case, a judge who declines to hand down a sentence of death, or 
who [upholds] the Bill of Rights, may thereby sign his own political death 
warrant.”). These political pressures can also influence the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion for elected district attorneys and for prosecutors who are 
not elected themselves but who may aspire to become judges. See id. at 781 (“One 
of the most frequently traveled routes to the state trial bench is through 
prosecutors’ offices. A capital case provides a prosecutor with a particularly rich 
opportunity for media exposure and name recognition that can later be helpful in 
a judicial campaign.”). 
 101. In 1998, Judge Charles Baird of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
was the sole dissenter from the denial of an appeal by Karla Faye Tucker, the 
first woman executed in Texas in the modern era. See Christy Hoppe, Board 
Unanimously Rejects Tucker's Plea for Clemency: Federal Courts, Governor Could 
Delay Execution, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Feb. 3, 1998) (reporting the legal 
decisions that led to the execution of Karla Faye Tucker). Soon thereafter, Judge 
Baird was ousted when he sought reelection. See Mark Hansen, Hanging Judges: 
Going Against Prevailing Currents in Capital Cases Can Sink a Career, 85 
A.B.A.J. 91 (1999) (“‘It was the worst thing I could have done for my political 
campaign,’ Baird said of the dissent. ‘But it was the right thing to do in the face 
of the law and due process.’”). For many other examples of judges made politically 
vulnerable by decisions in death penalty cases, see generally Bright & Keenan, 
supra note 98, at 761–65. 
 102. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (delineating procedures for judicial elections). 
 103. See, e.g., Bright & Keenan, supra note 98, at 789 (“[P]erceived ‘softness’ 
on crime or on the death penalty may have consequences not only for the judge, 
but also for those who would nominate or vote to confirm the judge . . . .”).  
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directly on these legislators, the safest path is to choose judges who 
will reliably comport with the prevailing political will.104 
In states like Virginia, where in many of its regions the death 
penalty has the backing of majorities, legislators have political 
incentives to elect judges who will find favor with the general 
electorate by demonstrating their willingness—sometimes even 
their eagerness—to impose death sentences.105 In a judicial 
selection system like this, the pro-death penalty views of the 
majority will control.106 The anti-death penalty views that 
predominate among minorities, who are disproportionately subject 
to the harshest punishments, will have far more difficulty finding 
their way to the bench.107 These political dynamics were especially 
pronounced in the late 1970s, an era of post-civil rights 
                                                                                                     
 104. See id. at 791–92 (“As a result of the increasing prominence of the death 
penalty in judicial elections as well as other campaigns for public office, judges 
are well aware of the consequences to their careers of unpopular decisions in 
capital cases.”). 
 105. Although support for the death penalty has declined somewhat in recent 
years, a majority of Americans still support it. See Shrinking Majority of 
Americans Support the Death Penalty, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/03/28/shrinking-majority-of-americans-support-
death-penalty/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that fifty-five percent of 
Americans favor the death penalty for murder compared to thirty-seven percent 
of Americans who oppose the practice) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Support for the death penalty also appears to be declining in Virginia, 
although a sizeable majority of Virginians continue to favor it. A November 2009 
poll by The Washington Post showed that two-thirds of Virginians still support 
the death penalty. See Jennifer Agiesta, On Eve of Execution, Virginians Broadly 
Support Death Penalty, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/2009/11/on_eve_of_execution 
_virginians.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (reporting that sixty-six percent of 
Virginians favor the death penalty compared to thirty-one percent who are 
opposed to the death penalty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 106. Under the Virginia Constitution, all state appellate judges are elected by 
the General Assembly as well. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. The error-correction role of 
the appellate bench can be compromised, especially on inflammatory issues such 
as capital sentences for those convicted of high profile local murders, when 
appellate judges share the political motivations and political vulnerability of trial 
judges. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 98, at 785 (“A few rulings in highly 
publicized cases may become more important to a judge’s survival on the bench 
than qualifications, judicial temperament, management of the docket, or 
commitment to the Constitution and the rule of law.”). 
 107. See Agiesta, supra note 105 (noting that a 2009 poll by The Washington 
Post showed that while seventy-two percent of white Virginians supported the 
death penalty, fifty-six percent of African Americans living in Virginia opposed 
it). 
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backlash.108 Through political structures controlled by white 
majorities, judges inclined toward issuing death sentences were 
selected to preside over Virginia’s courts.109 Racial dynamics 
played a supporting role in sustaining the judicial selection system 
that enhanced the likelihood that Giarratano would be condemned 
to die.  
5. Race of Victims 
These are the less than obvious ways that race influenced Joe 
Giarratano’s case. Yet the most obvious way that race played a role 
in the Giarratano case is that he was convicted of killing white 
victims.110 In America, capital punishment has been reserved 
primarily for those convicted of killing white people.111 Indeed, the 
Baldus study confirmed empirically what many had long 
understood from observation and experience.112 Baldus’ 
gargantuan study, conducted over years, demonstrated that 
defendants convicted of killing white victims increased their 
chances of receiving a death sentence by more than four times, 
compared with those convicted of killing non-whites, a statistic 
                                                                                                     
 108. See MANDERY, supra note 31, at 275 (discussing how, in the 1970s, 
“frustration with the Supreme Court was really born out of underlying resistance 
to the Court’s position on race and social issues”). Giarratano was convicted in 
1979, in the midst of this cultural battle. Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 
S.E.2d 94, 95 (Va. 1980). 
 109.  See Bright & Keenan, supra note 98, at 785 (examining the incentive 
structure that leads judges to issue death sentences). 
 110. See David Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan 
Weiner & Barbara Broffitt, Symposium, Racial Discrimination and the Death 
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent 
Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1657–58 (1998) (“[T]he 
defendants in white-victim cases were more likely to receive a death sentence 
than the defendants in black-victim cases. The strongest race-of-victim effects 
were observed among the cases with average levels of defendant culpability.”). 
 111. After systematically reviewing more than two-dozen existing studies 
concerning the influence of race on the death penalty, the General Accounting 
Office reported that in eighty-two percent of the studies, defendants convicted of 
murdering whites were more likely to receive death sentences than those 
convicted of murdering blacks. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., DEATH PENALTY 
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5–6 (1990).  
 112. See Stevenson, supra note 79, at 97 (“The legacy of racial apartheid, 
racial bias, and ethnic discrimination is unavoidably evident in the 
administration of capital punishment in America.”). 
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reinforcing a cultural message that the lives that matter most 
should be avenged and that white lives matter most.113 The Baldus 
study provides empirical evidence that an ideology of white 
supremacy, or ideas about racial difference, are at work in deciding 
which capital defendants will be chosen for death.114 
III. Other Ideologies at Work 
If this assessment of the way that race is implicated at least 
to some degree in all capital cases, including the Giarratano case, 
is sound, it follows that examining race alone will yield only a 
partial analysis. Race never occurs alone, but always in 
combination with other identity characteristics. For example, the 
victims that Giarratano was convicted of killing were not just 
white, they were white women.115 This opens additional questions: 
How does gender interact with race in the Giarratano case? 
Answering this question first requires a backdrop understanding 
of prevailing gender ideologies.  
A. Gender Ideologies 
Women have long been constructed as prototypical victims, a 
class of people vulnerable to male aggression and therefore 
dependent on the protection of other men.116 These are key 
                                                                                                     
 113. See Baldus et al., supra note 34, at 143 (detailing the statistical impact 
of the victim’s race on the likelihood of receiving a death sentence). 
 114. See Stevenson, supra note 79, at 99 (“The death penalty is dis-enabling 
to a nation still struggling to overcome the legacy of slavery and racial apartheid 
because it operates in a manner that reveals insidious race consciousness.”). 
 115. See 1991 Petition, supra note 87, Joint Appendix 2, Transcript of Hearing 
before Thomas R. McNamara, May 22, 1979, at 17 (describing each of the female 
victims, Michelle and Barbara Kline, as “Caucasian female”).  
 116. See CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, 
SELF-DEFENSE AND THE LAW 115–16 (1989) (describing differences in male and 
female socialization such that a woman can spend decades “absorbing the 
message that she is, and ought to be, gentle, weak and helpless; that she needs to 
be protected from pain and injury; that she cannot really rely on her own strength 
to save her”). This gender socialization may explain why researchers have 
identified a “female victim effect” in which crimes with female victims are 
punished more severely than crimes with male victims. See, e.g., Caisa Elizabeth 
Royer et al., Victim Gender and the Death Penalty, 82 UMKC. L. REV. 429, 429–
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features of patriarchy, a structure in which gender determines who 
acts and who is the recipient of others’ actions.117 Patriarchal 
cultures like ours often express chivalrous norms in circumstances 
where protecting women from male aggression is deemed 
appropriate.118 While no longer articulated as the basis of official 
policies, chivalry retains a surprising hold on popular 
consciousness.119 Even so, the generalization has significant 
qualifiers. 
For example, the more women diverge from classic female 
stereotypes—deferential, caretaking, demure, chaste, 
                                                                                                     
33, 461–63 (2014) (reviewing several studies finding a correlation between female 
victims and the likelihood that a death sentence will be pursued and imposed, 
and concluding after additional research that “victim gender continues to 
influence capital sentencing decisions”). 
 117. See Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 83, 83 (1980) (“By patriarchy, I mean any kind of group organization 
in which males hold dominant power and determine what part females shall and 
shall not play . . . .”). 
 118. Originally understood as the gallantry expected of knights, the word 
“chivalry” came to be used to mean “courtesy.” ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/chivalry (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). More precisely, given its origin in the 
behavioral code of the men who were knights, the word conveyed gendered 
imagery, such that one of its definitions is: “an honorable and polite way of 
behaving especially toward women.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/chivalry (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The female counterpart of chivalry was “the 
cult of true womanhood.” See Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 
1820–1860, 18 AM. Q. 151, 151–52 (1966) (detailing the manipulation of women 
into believing they should strive for piety, purity, submissiveness, and 
domesticity within the home). Only women perceived as conforming to these 
tenets of domesticity, submissiveness, piety, and purity were deemed worthy of 
protection, such that they applied primarily to middle-class white women. See 
PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON 
RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 5–8 (1984) (explaining race and class implications of 
gender ideologies). In addition to these race and class effects, gender ideologies 
reinforced the dominance and submission model of male-female relationships that 
feminist theorists have decried. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 42 (1987) (“[I]f gender is an inequality 
first, constructed as a socially relevant differentiation . . . then sex inequality 
questions are questions of systematic dominance, of male supremacy. . . .”). 
 119. See, e.g., Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the “Battered 
Woman’s Defense”: Towards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 567, 
575 (1991) (“[S]tereotypes of women as pure and passive, as caregivers and 
nurturers, have been taught and accepted by men—and women—for centuries, 
making the erosion of such beliefs a long and frustrating process.”). 
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submissive—the less likely it is that they will be deemed worthy of 
male protection.120 Moreover, chivalry is a color-coded 
phenomenon, in that some women of color, not as readily perceived 
as conforming to female stereotypes, are not granted the same level 
of protection.121 To the extent that the criminal justice system 
embodies dominant norms, created largely by those who organize 
and operate it—disproportionately empowered white men—white 
women are the standard beneficiaries of chivalrous responses.122 
Female murder victims, especially white female victims, can 
evoke chivalrous impulses that enhance the likelihood that death 
sentences will be imposed on those convicted of killing them.123 In 
                                                                                                     
 120.   
The ideology of gender has long suggested that to be a timid, delicate, 
passive, demure, docile, deferential, and nurturing caretaker is to be a 
woman worthy of the love and protection of men. . . . It is women’s 
inability to live up to the ideal that disqualifies them from entitlement 
to male protection . . . and contributes to women’s views that they are 
to blame for violence against them. 
Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the 
Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 582, 608 (1996). 
 121. See, e.g., Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: 
A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 198–99 (1991) (noting 
that, “[t]hroughout history, Black women’s experiences with patriarchy differed 
from those of white women” because Black women have been portrayed as 
deviant, immoral, and not worthy of male protection). 
 122. See Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive 
Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 27 (1999) (“Men are men to the extent they 
are not women: masculine, independent, invulnerable, tough, strong, aggressive, 
powerful, commanding, in control, rational, and non-emotional. ‘Real women’ 
(that is, middle- or upper-middle-class white women) are dependent, vulnerable, 
pliant, weak, supportive, nurturing, intuitive, emotional, and empathic.”). In the 
criminal justice system, decisions are made—whether on the basis of the 
gendered imagery of chivalry or otherwise—largely by white decision-makers. 
See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 79, at 91 (“Although black people constitute 26 
percent of the Alabama population, there are no African American appellate court 
judges in the entire state, and fewer than 2 percent of the prosecutors and 4 
percent of the criminal court judges are black.”). With the predominance of white 
males in criminal justice decision-making positions, outcomes show marked 
gender effects. See, e.g., Theodore R. Curry, The Conditional Effects of Victim and 
Offender Ethnicity and Victim Gender on Sentences for Non-Capital Cases, 12 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 438 (2010) (reporting that white female homicides produced 
longer sentences than homicides against men of all races). 
 123. See, e.g., Royer et al., supra note 116, at 431–32 (“Several studies have 
found that the murder of a white female puts the offender at the greatest risk of 
being sentenced to death.”). Although research has not proven that chivalrous 
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the Giarratano case, the fact that the murder victims Barbara 
“Toni” Kline and Michele Kline were white, mother and daughter, 
one a teenager, may have tapped the kind of unconscious gender 
imagery that increased the chances Giarratano would receive the 
death sentence.124 Rather than protecting them, he was found to 
have grievously harmed them—the teenage daughter sexually 
assaulted then strangled, her mother stabbed—an aggravated 
crime only intensified by the violation of chivalrous gender 
norms.125  
But chivalry has its limits. Because women are subject to more 
violence from family members and intimates than from any other 
source, one might think that protective impulses would have 
focused the harshest punishments on the domestic violence 
                                                                                                     
attitudes toward women explain these findings, Royer’s research team identified 
an influential variable—perceptions of victim vulnerability—that may increase 
the severity of punishment and correlate with gender. See id. at 436–37 (“[V]ictim 
vulnerability is likely to be relevant in determining sentencing.”). To the extent 
that perceived vulnerability on the basis of gender increases severity of 
punishment, the chivalry thesis may be implicated. See also Stephen P. Garvey, 
Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1538, 1557 (1998) (reporting that in surveys of capital jurors, when the 
victim was female, 21.3% of jurors found that fact aggravating).  
 124. See In re Joseph M. Giarratano, Jr., Petition for Conditional Pardon 3–5 
(September 4, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Petition] (describing the victims and their 
murders). In fact, Giarratano received the death sentence after his conviction for 
the rape-murder of Michelle, the teenage victim, whom the Virginia appellate 
court referred to as a child. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 103 
(Va. 1980). Through the use of the word “child,” the court may have been 
conveying perceptions of victim vulnerability that make a defendant more 
culpable and more deserving of death. Jurors have reported that killing a child 
victim would make them significantly more likely to sentence a defendant to 
death. See Scott E. Sundby, Symposium, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The 
Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 346–47 (2003) 
(“[M]ore than half of the jurors (53%) stat[ed] that a child victim would make 
them ‘much more likely’ to send the defendant to the death chamber); Garvey, 
supra note 123, at 1556 (reporting research showing that “a sizeable majority of 
jurors would be more likely to impose death if the victim was a child”). 
 125.  See Giarratano, 266 S.E.2d at 103 (finding the death penalty not 
excessive or disproportionate for the murder of Michelle, in part because of the 
horror she must have experienced as she was strangled); see also Elizabeth 
Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
367, 370, 380 (1991) (observing that felony murders represent a significant 
percentage of the murders that receive capital sentences and noting the extra 
opprobrium with which our culture regards rape-murders); Royer et al., supra 
note 116, at 461 (“[S]exual violence during the crime increased the likelihood that 
the defendant would be sentenced to death.”). 
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problem.126 Yet, perversely, had the female victims been 
Giarratano’s mother or wife or daughter, these relationships might 
have been mitigating facts, reducing the likelihood that he would 
receive a death sentence.127  
This punishment discount for the lethal violence men commit 
against female intimates disappears when the genders are 
reversed.128 While the lethal violence that women commit against 
male intimates is far less frequent, it is often punished more 
severely.129 Women are sentenced to death at higher rates than are 
men for domestic violence murders.130  
This collection of seemingly inconsistent responses to similar 
circumstances can be viewed as a problem of gender hierarchy. 
Statistics suggest that domestic violence is a wide-ranging 
                                                                                                     
 126. See NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Why Do Women Use 
Force or Violence in Intimate Partner Relationships?, http://ncadv.org/ 
files/Why%20Women%20Use%20Force%20or%20Violence%20in%20Intimate%2
0Partner%20Relationships.pdf (“Women are five times more likely than men to 
be victimized by a spouse or partner, ex-partner, boyfriend, or girlfriend.”); see 
also Diane Craven, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. SPECIAL REP., Sex Differences in 
Violence Victimization, 1994, at 4 (1997), http://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/SDVV.PDF (reporting that sixty-two percent of all victimizations against 
women were committed by people they knew). 
 127. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 (1980) (“The petitioner’s 
crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more ‘depraved’ 
than that of any person guilty of murder. His victims were killed instantaneously. 
They were members of his family who were causing him extreme emotional 
trauma.”); see also Rapaport, supra note 125, at 375 (“[M]urders of nonintimates 
by men are twice as likely to lead to the death penalty as are murders of 
intimates.”). Rapaport states that because domestic murders are more likely than 
predatory murders to have women and children as victims, regarding predatory 
murders as more heinous than domestic murders “privileges the interests of men 
over those of women and children and supports patriarchal values.” Id. at 378. 
Although Giarratano was acquainted with the two women he was convicted of 
killing, it would be an exaggeration to regard his as a conviction for domestic 
violence, because the evidence suggests he occasionally slept on the victims’ couch 
but was not in intimate relationship with either.  
 128. See Rapaport, supra note 125, at 382 (“[A] strikingly high percentage of 
the women on death row, unlike the men, killed family or intimates.”). 
 129. See id. at 367, 370–71 (presenting data showing that although “[t]he 
victims of women killers are substantially more likely than those of men to be 
family members and less likely to be strangers” and women commit a small 
percentage of murders, “death-sentenced women are more likely than death-
sentenced men to have killed intimates”). 
 130. See id. at 375–76 (“The high percentage of intimacy murders among 
death-sentenced women may reflect differential treatment of male and female 
murders of intimates . . . .”). 
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problem.131 In our current systems, the more common the problem, 
the more it crosses social classes, the less deviant it is, and the less 
appropriate the extreme sanction of the death penalty becomes.132 
As a result, male-on-female violence between intimates is 
punished less severely not despite the fact that it is rampant, but 
because it is.  
By contrast, the limited prevalence of female-perpetrated 
lethal violence between intimates makes it deviant behavior.133 
Additionally, although all of women’s violence defies gender 
stereotypes, domestic crimes violate the stereotype of women as 
family caregivers.134 Behaving counter to stereotype can operate to 
intensify punitive reactions to a crime.135 This gendered pattern of 
punishment perpetuates the patriarchal norms that bolster gender 
hierarchy, as women remain disproportionately subject to men’s 
violence, both private and public.136  
                                                                                                     
 131. One in five women have been victims of severe physical violence by an 
intimate partner in their lifetime. See Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.ncadv.org/learn/statistics (last visited Oct. 4, 
2016) (reporting statistics for intimate partner violence) (on file with Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 132. See Rapaport, supra note 125, at 376–77 (asserting that, although the 
death penalty is to be reserved for the most reprehensible murders, “[t]he worst 
cases of domestic violence, unlike the worst cases of robbery violence, are not, as 
such, eligible for capital adjudication”). 
 133. See id. at 369–71 (“[I]n the twelve years 1976–1987, women made up 14.3 
percent of murder and non-negligent manslaughter suspects known to the police” 
but “women who kill are more likely than men to kill family and other 
intimates.”). 
 134. See Goldfarb, supra note 120, at 608 (including “nurturing caretaker” as 
part of the ideological content of gender for women). 
 135. See, e.g., Victor L. Streib, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 878–79 (1990) (observing 
that women sentenced to death and executed were likely to be “poor, uneducated, 
of the lowest social class in the community,” and to have “manifested an attitude 
of violence”). Streib further notes that “[t]heir victims tended to be white and of 
particularly protected classes, either children or socially prominent adults” and 
that “perhaps most fatally for them, they committed shockingly ‘unladylike’ 
behavior allowing the sentencing judges and juries to put aside any image of them 
as ‘the gentler sex.’” Id.; see also Carroll, supra note 6, at 1451–52 (noting the role 
of violating gender expectations in death sentencing for women). 
 136. See Rapaport, supra note 125, at 379 (challenging the view that domestic 
violence, “from which women and children suffer disproportionately, is less 
reprehensible” than stranger violence). Rapaport suggests that “[t]he supposition 
that predatory violence is more reprehensible than domestic violence is a 
symptom or effect of the ancient family privacy doctrine that has supported male 
domestic authority . . . at the price of tolerating . . . a culture of domestic 
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Principles of human psychology support the status quo. 
Because decision-making in the criminal justice system is likely to 
serve the felt interests of those who organize and operate it—
again, disproportionately white men—these decision-makers may 
identify in some respects with men who contribute to the 
widespread problem of domestic violence crimes against female 
intimates.137 Identification may contribute to a reluctance to 
punish these crimes harshly.138 At the same time, these decision-
makers are less likely to identify with those who commit crimes 
against women who are non-intimates.139 In fact, they may punish 
these crimes with special fervor, reserving their chivalrous 
responses for circumstances like these.140 
Of course, race and class ideologies intersect with these gender 
patterns. Non-intimates who commit violence against women are 
perceived as menacing predators, creating imagery that has been 
coded by race, class, and gender for centuries.141 Inflicting harsh 
                                                                                                     
violence.” Id. 
 137. See Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson, & Zoe Robinson, Implicit White 
Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 895 (2015) (“At 
the core of research on implicit in-group favoritism is the principle that people 
automatically associate the in-group or ‘us,’ with positive characteristics, and the 
out-group, or ‘them,’ with negative characteristics.”).  
 138. See id. at 895–96 (reporting results of study that found in-group 
favoritism to be an automatic and strong phenomenon).  
 139. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 247 
(2000) (describing the process by which decision-makers “disempower the group 
constructed as ‘other’ in order to empower our group by contrast to ‘them’” and 
requiring us to imbue “the ‘others’ with intrinsic, immutable qualities making 
them different from us”). 
 140. See Haney, supra note 83, at 1460–61 (“Human beings react punitively 
toward persons whom they regard as defective, foreign, deviant, or fundamentally 
different from themselves.”); id. at 1463 (“[F]ew capital jurors will every truly 
know—by experience, identification, or intuition—the harsh realities of capital 
defendants’ lives.”). 
 141. The racialized treatment of rape allegations is especially revealing. See 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 68, at 35 (reporting prior research results 
showing that “there has been a systematic, differential practice of imposing the 
death penalty on blacks for rape and, most particularly, when the defendants are 
black and their victims are white”). Although the death penalty is no longer 
available for rape, it is available for rape-murders and inflammatory racial 
imagery can infect those trials. See, e.g., PETE EARLEY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE: DEATH, LIFE, AND JUSTICE IN A SOUTHERN TOWN (1995) (relaying a 
journalist’s account of the capital case of an African-American man falsely 
convicted—based on perjured testimony and appeals to prejudice—but later 
exonerated of the murder of a young white woman in Monroeville, Alabama, the 
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punishment, including death sentences, in situations like these 
supports the status quo and its multiple intersecting hierarchies, 
allowing chivalrous impulses to be expressed primarily against 
poor men, men of color, and other men lacking in social and 
material power.142  
 Moreover, patriarchal gender norms socialize men to commit 
aggressive acts to a far greater extent than women.143 Our culture 
is not so chivalrous as to exclude women from death sentences, but, 
when provoked to impose the death penalty,144 it imposes death 
sentences primarily on those understood to be violent aggressors, 
who will be disproportionately male.145 In these circumstances, the 
death penalty acts symbolically to annihilate the threat they 
pose.146 Despite the absence of evidence that the death penalty 
makes society safer, the cultural choice to use state violence to re-
assert dominance over those deemed to have perpetrated violence 
can be understood in patriarchal terms as well, a response 
consistent with socialization into male-defined roles of dominance 
and aggression.147  
                                                                                                     
setting for a similar case in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird).  
 142. Because the same degree of opprobrium is not shown for crimes against 
family victims, Elizabeth Rapaport notes “the extreme disapprobation which our 
society reserves for crimes inflicted on other men’s women and children.” 
Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty, 20 
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 501, 559 (1990). 
 143. See id. at 510 (“More than ninety-five percent of those convicted of violent 
crimes are male.”); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: 
Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189–90 (1991) (examining 
interconnections between forms of subordination, “both the obvious and non-
obvious relationships of domination,” and suggesting an explanation of the 
racially-motivated murder of a Chinese-American man as not just an expression 
of racism, but also of patriarchy, the acculturation of boys into a patriarchal 
culture of “dominance and aggression”). 
 144. See Rapaport, supra note 125, at 367 (noting that although “it is widely 
supposed that women murderers are chivalrously spared the death 
sentence . . . women are represented on contemporary U.S. death rows in 
numbers commensurate with the infrequency of female commission of those 
crimes which our society labels sufficiently reprehensible to merit capital 
punishment”). 
 145. See id. at 373 (“Men are demonstrably more prone than women to commit 
violent crime.”). 
 146. See Joan W. Howarth, Review Essay: Feminism, Lawyering, and Death 
Row, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 401, 414 (1992) (“The execution is a ritual 
by which law-abiding people reclaim power from criminals.”). 
 147. See id. at 411–20 (arguing that feminists should oppose capital 
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Beyond these gender patterns, there are other ways that we 
might see patriarchal ideologies as implicated in the crime for 
which Joe Giarratano was convicted. A mother and daughter in 
Norfolk, Virginia were brutally slaughtered. While there is a 
genuine question as to the identity of the perpetrator, the odds are 
good that the perpetrator was a person who had been socialized by 
1979 into a predominantly male culture of dominant and 
aggressive behavior, including its misogynistic expressions.148 
Viewed in this way, it is fair to say that forty-year-old patriarchal 
norms played a significant role in the violent tragedy that took two 
lives and forcibly re-directed Joe Giarratano’s life into decades of 
confinement.  
B. Class Ideologies 
Class bias is implicated in the Giarratano case in more and 
less obvious ways. Like Giarratano, people under death sentence 
are, nearly to a person, people lacking in means, an easily 
foreseeable consequence of societal decisions to underfund systems 
of public defense.149 Many had poor representation at the trials 
                                                                                                     
punishment because, among other reasons, the death penalty dehumanizes and 
objectifies people, and uses the legal system “to convert killing a person into 
something lawful . . . the triumph of an idealized version of justice that hides the 
racist, classist, messy, freakish, and imperfect reality”). Howarth views these 
aspects of capital punishment as incompatible with feminism and, implicitly, as 
a product of the dominant, non-feminist, patriarchal world view. This world view 
emerges from what sociologist Allan Johnson understands as “patriarchy’s core 
motivating force”—“male distrust and fear of other men.” See Becker, supra note 
122, at 24 (“Patriarchal culture values ‘control and domination’ most, because 
control and domination of other men ensures one’s own safety from them.”). 
Supporting this perspective, Robert Burt has compared the death penalty to war-
making, another male-identified institution. See Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the 
Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1764 (1987) 
(“Capital punishment is warfare writ small.”). 
 148. See Becker, supra note 122, at 26–30 (“Although the subjugation of 
women is not the central dynamic driving patriarchy, patriarchal culture is 
deeply misogynistic and valorizes masculinity. . . . [V]iolence [against women 
is] . . . more understandable when one considers how love, need, fear, envy, hate, 
and resentment combine in the feelings of many men toward women.”). 
 149. See Death Penalty Representation, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-representation (last visited Sept. 
8, 2016) (“Almost all defendants in capital cases cannot afford their own 
attorneys. In many cases, the appointed attorneys are overworked, underpaid, or 
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that resulted in their death sentences.150 We know that the quality 
of representation significantly correlates with the quality of 
justice, yet under a system of law we permit the harshest 
punishments to be imposed on thousands of people who receive the 
compromised form of justice that we make available to those who 
cannot pay to defend their lives.151 Devoting insufficient public 
resources to accurate fact-finding and therefore unfairly allocating 
the risk of punishment to the poorest people is a virulent form of 
class bias.152 
The legal vulnerability that class inequality creates 
compounds many other vulnerabilities. While being poor in 
America may include being disproportionately subject to 
unjustified punishment, even lethal punishment, we also know 
that it can include struggling to put food on the table and a roof 
overhead for you and your family.153 Low-income communities 
                                                                                                     
lacking the trial experience required for death penalty cases.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). In Alabama, the state with the highest per 
capita rate of executions in the United States, there is no statewide public 
defender system, despite the fact that ninety-five percent of death row inmates 
are indigent. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SLAMMING THE COURTHOUSE 
DOORS: DENIAL OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND REMEDY IN AMERICA 7–8 (2010), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/HRP_UPRsubmission_annex.pdf. 
 150. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for 
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (“Poor 
people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who lack the skills, 
resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters. This fact is confirmed 
in case after case.”). 
 151. The observation that quality of representation correlates with quality of 
justice is so readily apparent that it unites commentators across the political 
spectrum. Compare id. (“It is not the facts of the crime, but the quality of legal 
representation, that distinguishes th[e] case where the death penalty was 
imposed, from many similar cases, where it was not.”), and Stevenson, supra note 
79, at 97 (“Death sentences are imposed in a criminal justice system that treats 
you better if you are rich and guilty than if you are poor and innocent.”), with 
Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal 
Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319–21 (2011) (stating that legal outcomes 
are influenced by significant disparities in the quality of legal representation).  
 152. See Stevenson, supra note 79, at 95–96 (“Poverty has become a defining 
feature of America’s death penalty system. Support for capital punishment 
necessarily means accepting a punishment that is applied unequally and that 
largely condemns poor and disfavored defendants who are unable to obtain 
adequate legal assistance.”). 
 153. Because “the United States has greater economic inequality than any 
other developed nations . . . a vast array of Americans face systemic restraints 
inhibiting or eliminating their chances to be successful.” DOOB, supra note 1, at 
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where education and health are poor, where jobs and opportunities 
are scarce, and where trauma and substance abuse are high 
contain crime-generating conditions, yet other than policing and 
punishment, our culture offers little assistance to those who grow 
up in these communities and who, by and large, stay in them.154 
Joseph Giarratano experienced these multiple forms of class 
bias. Subject to violence and abuse as a child, he received limited 
services.155 When he ran away, authorities repeatedly returned 
him to his abusive home.156 Foreseeably, the traumatized, severely 
depressed, and abused child grew into a substance-abusing 
adolescent and young adult.157 The cumulative physiological and 
                                                                                                     
8, 17; see also Robert Rector & Rachel Sheffield, Understanding Poverty in the 
United States: Surprising Facts About America’s Poor, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 
13, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/understanding-
poverty-in-the-united-states-surprising-facts-about-americas-poor (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2016) (stating that the traditional definition of the word “poor” suggests 
“an inability to provide nutritious food, clothing, and reasonable shelter for one’s 
family”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Haney understands 
the death penalty process as withholding from jurors the role of poverty—its 
undermining of parenting that makes poor children vulnerable to depression, 
impulsivity, low self-esteem, substance abuse, and delinquency—in the etiology 
of crime, resulting in an attribution of the defendant’s violence to his inherent 
evil. See Haney, supra note 83, at 1471–73 (“[M]ost habits of violence and 
aggressive demeanors are learned defensively—usually in childhood and often in 
response to chronically abusive, harmful, or threatening circumstances 
defendants certainly did not choose and over which they had no control.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Kathryne M. Young & Joan Petersilia, Keeping Track: 
Surveillance, Control, and the Expansion of the Carceral State, Pulled Over: How 
Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1322 (2016) 
(Book Review) (observing that the criminal justice system creates a perpetual, 
“peripheral” citizenship). Criminal justice system-induced peripheral citizenship 
is difficult to escape because, as the authors observe, “the modern criminal justice 
apparatus destabilizes lives, particularly those lived in poor and minority 
communities.” Id.  Consequently, “[i]nstead of helping people gain stability, the 
system actually frustrates people’s chances of getting jobs, keeping their housing, 
and staying out of trouble.” Id. 
 155. See 1991 Petition, supra note 87, at 5 (“Social Service authorities 
recognized, at least as early as 1973, that his home environment was unhealthy 
and some attempts were made to find an alternative home; but Joe always was 
returned to his mother’s guardianship.”).  
 156. See id. (noting that “[a]t an early age, Joe began trying to escape the 
horror and shame of the abuse to which he was subjected by running away from 
home,” though he was repeatedly returned).  
 157. See id. (“When running away failed to provide the escape he so 
desperately needed, and when authorities consistently returned him to a life of 
physical, psychological, and sexual abuse, Joe, at eleven years old, turned to 
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psychological effects of living with such struggles, without 
protection or assistance, throughout his formative years contribute 
to an understanding of how Joe Giarratano became vulnerable to 
prosecution for murder, why he reached the doubtful conclusion 
that he was responsible for murder, how he found a court system 
willing to condemn to death to be a viable route out of the misery 
in his life,158 and why his appointed attorney would stand by and 
allow his client to pursue this self-destructive path.159 Viewed from 
                                                                                                     
drugs, the escape that was most readily available in his home.”). 
 158.  
Without an understanding of the effects of childhood abuse and drug 
and alcohol blackouts, most people who have led relatively normal 
lives would not understand why a person would assume they did 
something as horrible as killing two people and go on to confess to 
such a crime. . . Being so convinced, [Giarratano] did everything he 
could to convince others [that he should receive a death sentence] or 
carry out the job himself [through suicide].  
Id. at 11, 14. 
 159. While Giarratano’s questionable belief in his own guilt and his suicidal 
mental state rendered him unable to assist in his defense and incompetent to 
stand trial, his court-appointed attorney did little to try to understand 
Giarratano’s situation, background, psychological state, or even the facts of the 
case—information germane to the sentencing phase as well as the guilt-innocence 
phase. Id. at 69. Instead, “his attorney simply assumed that Mr. Giarratano was 
guilty, just as did everyone else.” Id. at 64. This assumption, and the likely 
awareness that Giarratano wanted to die, prevented the attorney from 
performing rudimentary aspects of his role, such as conducting fact investigation 
or impeaching a police officer who testified that Giarratano confessed to raping 
Michelle Kline, even though the officer’s written, contemporaneous record of 
Giarratano’s statement contained no such admission. Id. at 44–45. This is a key 
piece of testimony, as the rape made the murder of Michelle death-eligible under 
Virginia’s statute. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 99 (Va. 1980) 
(upholding Girratano’s conviction for capital murder under the statutory 
provision that authorizes a capital sentence for the “willful, deliberate and 
premeditated killing of a person during the commission of, or subsequent to, 
rape”). 
Imagine how different Giarratano’s trial might have been if his attorney had 
created the kind of trusting relationship with his client that Marie Deans was 
subsequently able to form. See infra note 178 and accompanying text (describing 
the Giarratano-Deans relationship). While our system does not facilitate court-
appointed attorneys devoting themselves to such a degree to a single client, in a 
case like this one a greater measure of individualized attention was part of the 
attorney’s duty of representation. See, e.g., James M. Doyle, The Lawyers’ Art: 
‘Representation’ in Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417, 426 (1996) 
(observing the “consensus among accomplished death-penalty lawyers” that they 
should “collect all of the information—school records, medical history, family 
memories, the defendant’s own accounts—that bear on the defendant’s humanity” 
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this perspective, the Giarratano case illustrates how, in our society 
and its legal system, class strata matter in a profound material 
way. 
C. Interlocking Ideologies 
The overlap between class subordination and race 
subordination is dramatic.160 The reasons that racial minorities, 
and especially African-Americans, are overrepresented among the 
poor are not accidental but structural.161 Among the multiple 
brutalities and deprivations imposed by race-based chattel slavery 
was the deprivation of African-Americans’ access to a livelihood.162 
The century after slavery’s end saw the emergence of multiple 
obstacles for African-Americans, including markedly unequal 
                                                                                                     
then “present this information in as compelling a form as possible”). 
 160. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 79, at 94 (“Racial minorities in the United 
States are also disproportionately poor. Poverty and economic disadvantage 
among people of color increase the risk of wrongful or unfair treatment in the 
criminal justice system.”); see also DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW 
EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE 11 (2014): 
[I]ssues of class are in the US issues of race. This is true particularly 
when it comes to the poorest of the poor. . . . Owing to discrimination, 
those families who can afford to pass down wealth for college 
educations and housing down payments tend to be disproportionately 
white. The same goes for networks that are able to refer high paying 
jobs in lucrative occupations. Set against the backdrop of Jim Crow and 
slavery, institutional feedback loops reproduce racial disparity. . . . 
 161. See Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid: Segregation and the 
Making of the Underclass, 96 AM. J. SOC. 329, 345 (1990) (using data to 
demonstrate that racial segregation in housing plays a key role in concentrating 
poverty and creating an urban underclass, because “[r]acial segregation takes the 
overall loss in black income, concentrates it spatially, and focuses it on fragile 
neighborhoods that are the least able to absorb it”); see also ROITHMAYR, supra 
note 160, at 4–10 (arguing that racial inequality persists because early white 
advantage leads to continuing advantage, maintaining a “self-reinforcing system 
of distribution of resources and opportunities . . . built on the foundations of 
slavery and Jim Crow”). 
 162. See Rogers M. Smith, “One United People”: Second-Class Female 
Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 
257 (1989) (arguing that the ideology underlying the Constitution’s three post-
war amendments was “the central importance of free labor as the source of all 
productive value” and that “every human being had a natural right to pursue his 
trade and reap the fruits of his labor,” making slavery “the height of injustice”).  
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access to education, jobs, housing, and health care.163 These 
conditions compounded the racialized uses of law enforcement and 
ensnared many African-Americans in criminal justice processes.164 
In turn, criminal sanctions produced further obstacles, as the 
disabilities that accompanied them reduced the prospect for 
material subsistence and opportunity.165 Such potent and 
interactive structural combinations preserved racial hierarchy by 
stifling the economic progress and life’s chances of African-
Americans.  
While European immigrants came to colonial America for 
economic opportunity, African people were forcibly brought to 
America to promote the economic advance of European-
Americans.166 Extending from these early mutually reinforcing 
structures of race, power, and wealth, economic dependency and 
exploitation became persistent features of America’s structures of 
                                                                                                     
 163. See ROITHMAYR, supra note 160, at 4–10 (explaining the continuous 
reproduction of racial hierarchy through the cartel-like conduct of white 
majorities in the allocation of economic opportunities such as housing, jobs, and 
education); ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 35 (“By the turn of the twentieth 
century, every state in the South had laws . . . that disenfranchised blacks and 
discriminated . . . in virtually every sphere of life, lending sanction to a racial 
ostracism that extended to schools, churches, housing, jobs, restrooms, hotels, 
restaurants, hospitals, orphanages, prisons, funeral homes, morgues, and 
cemeteries.”); see also BAPTIST, supra note 24, at xvi (“In non-Confederate states, 
many restaurants wouldn’t serve black customers. Stores and factories refused to 
hire African Americans. Hundreds of Midwestern communities forcibly evicted 
African-American residents . . . .”). 
 164. When the civil rights era abolished formal segregation, Alexander argues 
that a nationwide law and order movement focused on African-Americans 
replaced segregation as the mechanism for maintaining racial hierarchy. 
ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 35–40. 
 165. See id. at 1–2 (“Once you’re labeled a felon, the old forms of 
discrimination—employment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of 
the right to vote, denial of educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and 
other public benefits, and exclusion from jury service—are suddenly legal.”); see 
also DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND FAMILY 
LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA 174 (2004) (finding that the inability of released prisoners 
“to earn a decent living and support a family was far more shameful than their 
criminality”). According to Braman, “the stigma of criminality leads to the shame 
of being unable to support one's children, to help one’s mother, and so forth.” Id.  
 166. See BAPTIST, supra note 24, at xxi–xxii (arguing that returns from the 
cotton monopoly power enabled by slavery drove American economic expansion, 
modernization, and industrialization, such that it is accurate to say “the 
commodification and suffering and forced labor of African Americans is what 
made the United States powerful and rich”). 
MATTERS OF STRATA 1437 
racial difference, interacting with racialized allocation of failing 
schools, predatory business practices, limited employment, and the 
devastating lifelong consequences of criminal convictions.167 
America might well have waged a more effective war on poverty if 
it were not simultaneously a war on race subordination, if poverty 
alleviation could have been accomplished without undermining the 
structures that for centuries have supported a system of racial 
caste.168 
If structures of race make Americans less interested in 
eliminating structures of poverty, then race is a discernible part of 
the reason that capital defendants have inadequate lawyers at 
trial, part of the reason that our society has not supported a 
higher-functioning criminal justice system, and even part of the 
reason that so few social services are available to people like Joe 
Giarratano, whose life might have been transformed far earlier if 
services had been available to him when he had urgent needs for 
help. In an indirect yet meaningful way, the interlocking realities 
of race and class stratification in America can be viewed as playing 
a significant role in the tragically converging situations that led to 
Joe Giarratano’s conviction. 
                                                                                                     
167.  
[W]ith high rates of poverty come a variety of other social and 
economic conditions: reduced buying power, increased welfare 
dependence, high rates of family disruption, elevated crime rates, 
housing deterioration, elevated infant mortality rates, and decreased 
educational quality. These outcomes, moreover, do not occur in 
isolation but represent a set of mutually reinforcing conditions.  Thus, 
the increase in poverty concentration that follows automatically when 
the minority poverty rate rises in a segregated city brings about a 
constellation of other changes in the social and economic composition 
of neighborhoods that have profound implications for the well-being 
of those who live there. 
Massey, supra note 161, at 342. 
 168. Alleviating poverty would significantly alter America’s status quo racial 
hierarchy, because the racial wealth gap remains “staggeringly large,” though it 
traces to Jim Crow and slavery. See ROITHMAYR, supra note 160, at 62 (citing 
economic data showing that “the dramatic wealth differences at emancipation—
when black former slave families began with zero net worth—and the impact of 
segregated schooling likely explain the majority of modern wealth differences”). 
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IV. What’s Lost and What’s Learned 
Learning about the sterling qualities of intellect169 and 
altruism170 that Joe Giarratano exhibits today, we cannot help but 
wonder why, as a culture, we are willing to sacrifice so many who 
are capable of so much.171 What lessons do we derive from the 
wrenching Gothic story that resulted in Giarratano’s decades of 
incarceration? Do social stratification and structures of 
subordination prevent us from experiencing our connection to 
children living in scarring conditions like those that Giarratano 
endured? Why do we let fester the conditions that lead to crime 
and then regard the crime as nothing more than a voluntary act of 
individual responsibility? The need to maintain race, gender, and 
class hierarchies begins an explanation of what is otherwise 
inexplicable and disfiguring. 
                                                                                                     
 169. See 2009 Petition, supra note 115, at 9 (“On death row, Joe became a 
voracious reader, studying philosophy, American history . . . [,] and peaceful 
conflict resolution. Joe educated himself to an extent that many never 
achieve . . . began to study the law, and learned that he possessed a hidden talent, 
despite his almost complete lack of any formal education.”). Giarratano’s law 
review article considering the importance of appellate remedies in capital cases 
was published in the Yale Law Journal. See generally Joseph M. Giarratano, “To 
the Best of Our Knowledge, We Have Never Been Wrong”: Fallibility vs. Finality 
in Capital Punishment, 100 YALE L.J. 1005 (1991). 
 170. See 2009 Petition, supra note 124, at 9–10 (describing Joe’s work as a 
jailhouse lawyer, filing motions, petitions, and stays of execution on behalf of 
dozens of Virginia inmates who had no lawyers, including Earl Washington, later 
exonerated by DNA evidence, who would have been executed but for Giarratano’s 
legal intervention on his behalf); id. at 10–11 (describing Giarratano’s assistance 
to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in challenging inhumane prison 
conditions, and his creation of an inmate-led peace studies and alternatives to 
violence program). Professor Jack Boger describes Giarratano as “unfailingly 
thoughtful, courteous, honorable, deeply concerned about others,” observing that 
Giarratano “has worried more about, and has done more for, his fellow inmates 
on Virginia’s death row—many of them illiterate and confused about their 
plight—than have their prison counselors and attorneys.” Id. at 46.  
 171. Giarratano’s transformation is described as “a testament to the power of 
the positive force of the human spirit.” Id. at 1. Professor Michael Milleman 
writes, “In another lifetime, with the most modest family support that we all take 
for granted, Joe Giarratano would have been a brilliant lawyer.” Id. at 46; see also 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 
409 (2001) (“We are to acknowledge that life’s miseries strike deep, striking to the 
heart of human agency itself. And yet we are also to insist that they do not remove 
humanity, that the capacity for goodness remains when all else has been 
removed.”). 
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Many people’s acts were involved in creating the situation of 
defendants like Joe Giarratano, including the acts of turning deaf 
ears toward defendants’ needs.172 Recognizing this collective role, 
the caricature of a crime as an act of individual free will by a 
defendant who is an enemy of the community begins to unravel.173 
Instead, the defendant can be seen as the offspring of the 
community.174  
                                                                                                     
 172. Some argue that individual behavior should be understood as collectively 
produced. See generally John Hospers, What Means This Freedom?, in FREE WILL 
AND DETERMINISM 26 (Bernard Berofsky ed., 1966). Craig Haney argues that the 
individualist ideology of criminal behavior found a strong foothold after the 
widespread poverty that economic transformations of the nineteenth century 
produced, because its accompanying concerns about social control of economic and 
property crime led the middle and upper classes to view crime as contained in the 
character of the lower classes, “thereby justifying their punitive segregation.” See 
Craig Haney, Criminal Justice and the Nineteenth-Century Paradigm: The 
Triumph of Psychological Individualism in the ‘Formative Era’, 6 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 191, 198 (1982) [hereinafter Haney, The Nineteenth-Century Paradigm] 
(“Urbanization and industrialization had created increasing numbers of alienated 
and dislocated poor who were more likely to commit economic crime. At the same 
time, there now existed a propertied class with a growing desire to be protected 
from the poor.”). Therefore, Haney sees the individualist view as sociohistorically 
contingent, and anachronistic, although “it has continued to serve as the core 
behavioral assumption of American criminal law.” Id. at 229–30; see also Craig 
Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, 
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1564 
(2004) (“[E]xposure to violent, abusive parenting is criminogenic.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 173. Richard Boldt has examined the ideological function of ascribing free will 
to individuals through criminal justice blaming practices that “submerg[e] the 
causal roots of conduct . . . .” Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility 
in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 2245, 2253 (1992); see also Robin West, 
Narrative, Responsibility, and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases 
from the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 175 (1990) (arguing 
that talking exclusively about rights and neglecting narratives undermines the 
“opportunity to construct an alternative understanding of societal responsibility 
for criminality that might challenge the unbridled individualism of the narrative 
account provided by the conservative majority”). 
 174. See Haney, The Nineteenth-Century Paradigm, supra note 172, at 228 
(“[A] person is a personality because he belongs to a community . . . .” (quoting 
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GEORGE HERBERT MEAD 239 
(1956))); see also id. (“[T]he interdependence of the individual personality with 
the institutional structure of society [is] destroying the one-way notion of social 
causation and criticizing its underlying individualism” (quoting RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 159 (1955))). According to 
Haney, these “powerful competing perspectives” emphasize “the social and 
cultural determinants of behavior.” Id. at 227–29. 
In another criminal justice context, James Doyle observes the role of collective 
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Though it is considered anathema to American criminal 
justice, communal responsibility for conditions that generate crime 
is an idea found in many sources.175 Some feminist philosophies 
articulate it, some of them grounding the perspective in women’s 
traditional role as caretakers of dependents and extending the 
perspective into social and political life.176 Joe Giarratano’s life 
gives us reason to reconsider our culture’s thorough rejection of a 
communal responsibility perspective.  
Freed from the addictions that numbed the pain of a childhood 
of abuse,177 enabled by relationships with extraordinary people 
                                                                                                     
decisions in individual choices about involvement in illegal drug activity: 
A claim that [inner city] residents bear no responsibility for the drug 
epidemic that plagues their communities would be ridiculous, but can 
it possibly be true that the larger society bears no 
responsibility? . . . The [inner city] has no goods or services, or at least 
so few that the decision to traffic in drugs is an economically rational 
(even if morally unattractive) decision. The economic conditions that 
have given rise to that situation cannot be entirely a product of the 
[inner city] itself. The drugs are not grown, or refined, or even, for the 
most part, wholesaled in the [inner city]. Nevertheless, larger society 
tends to assume that the [inner city] residents, so distant and different, 
have created the drug epidemic for themselves. 
James M. Doyle, Into the Eight Ball: The Colonialists’ Landscape in American 
Criminal Justice, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 65, 93 (1992). 
 175. See also CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, 
POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 22, 203 (1992) (urging concrete policies based on 
an understanding of the dynamic between individual responsibility and societal 
obligations “to distribute our material goods and services more equally” and to 
“reduce poverty, joblessness, illiteracy, violence, or despair” by changing “our 
institutions and attitudes in hundreds of small ways”); Sharon Beckman, Can 
Criminal Punishment Survive Christian Scrutiny?: A Comment on Jeffrey 
Murphy’s ‘Christianity and Criminal Punishment’, in 6 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY, 
no. 1, 2004, at 87, 88, 93 (arguing that Christian principles would preclude “harsh, 
condemnatory, and stigmatizing” criminal punishments that follow from “our 
widespread toleration of intolerable conditions,” our disregard of “disparate 
impact on people of color and the poor,” and “our failure to explore less destructive 
ways of promoting public well being. . . .”). See generally Mead, supra note 174; 
Hofstadter, supra note 174; NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES (1988) (critiquing individual culpability as a 
basis for criminal punishment and grounding justifications for punishment in 
communitarian political theory). 
 176. See generally NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO ETHICS 
AND MORAL EDUCATION (2d ed. 2013); OLENA HANKIVSKY, SOCIAL POLICY AND THE 
ETHIC OF CARE (2004); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997); ALLISON M. 
JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983). 
 177. Giarratano’s mother physically abused him, leading him to use drugs 
and alcohol—readily available in his home—at such an early age that by the time 
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like Marie Deans,178 exposed to important philosophical thinkers 
through the books that he read in the solitude of his cell,179 Joe 
Giarratano gained access to his ability and his humanity.180 He has 
been cultivating them ever since, through reading, 
communicating, peacemaking, writing letters, writing blogs, 
writing briefs, and helping fellow inmates craft pro se legal claims 
that their lawyers might file if only they had lawyers.181  
                                                                                                     
he was twenty-one, a medical examination found that his liver was already 
permanently damaged. See 2009 Petition, supra note 124, at 2–3 (describing the 
abuse that Giarratano suffered as a child). Ironically, his life changed when he 
came to death row: “On death row he purged himself of the alcohol and hard 
drugs . . . . When the fog cleared, another person seemed to emerge.” Maryanne 
Vollers, As His Date with the Executioner Nears, Joe Giarratano Says He’s No 
Killer—and Some People Believe Him, PEOPLE (May 28, 1990), 
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20117758,00.html (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 178. At the time Marie Deans met Giarratano, she was the executive director 
of the Virginia Coalition on Jails and Prisons. She also had been the founder of 
Murder Victims Families for Reconciliation. When they met, Giarratano was on 
anti-psychotic medication and was seeking to waive his appeals to hasten his 
execution. Deans persuaded Giarratano that his own life was worth saving and 
that he should pursue appellate remedies. She also uncovered evidence that cast 
doubt on the reliability of Giarratano’s confessions and raised the possibility of 
his innocence. See 2009 Petition, supra note 124, at 5–7 (identifying problems 
with the evidence supporting the theory that Giarratano murdered Barbara and 
Michelle Kline). Giarratano credits Deans with restoring his will to live and to 
take his appeals rather than submit to execution: “She told me I wasn’t a monster. 
I was a human being, and she cared about me. Nobody had ever told me things 
like that before.” Vollers, supra note 177.  
 179. See Vollers, supra note 177 (“Although Giarratano had never before 
finished a book, the shelf in his cell began to accumulate well-thumbed works of 
Aristotle, Gandhi, and Goethe.”); see also 1991 Petition, supra note 87, at 20 
(“When Joe is not doing legal work, he is reading or writing. He is a student of 
Tocqueville, Locke, Jefferson, Hume and the American Constitution, which he 
knows, understands and loves as few Americans do. He is also a student of 
theology . . . Dostoevsky, Faulkner, Camus and Pirsig.”).  
 180. Giarratano has been described as having an “agile intelligence,” “hunger 
for learning,” “basic decency,” and “concern for others around him.” See 2009 
Petition, supra note 124, at 68 (identifying traits Giarratano exhibits that make 
an impression on those who meet him). Martha Geer, an attorney for the law firm 
that filed in the U.S. Supreme Court the case of Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 
1 (1989), wrote that Giarratano “critiqued our papers and our arguments with a 
sophistication that I cannot explain—I have no idea where it comes from given 
his educational and cultural background . . . . He got nothing out of this. All of the 
effort was on behalf of others and on behalf of the principle of fairness.” Id. at 57. 
 181. See Colman McCarthy, Death Row Certainties, WASH. POST (June 11, 
1989) (“[Giarratano] has lived 10 years in . . . a cage with the prospect of death as 
the sole release—and yet his discussion of justice, nonviolence and human rights 
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Joseph Giarratano’s transformation reveals to us the 
extraordinary cost of our social, political, and legal structures of 
subordination. His continued incarceration, even after he has 
become parole eligible and reasonable doubt of innocence has been 
documented, compels us to find other approaches.182 Were it not 
for the distortions introduced by race, gender, and class ideologies, 
the tragedies of his life might have been altered, and his treatment 
by the criminal justice system might have been more attentive and 
accurate.183 At the same time, released from imagined 
                                                                                                     
is as lucid as any I have heard. I have read some of his writings.  They, too, are 
reflective and reasoned.”). As for Giarratano’s legal work, McCarthy writes: 
“Among his successful appeals is one that gives Virginia prisoners the right to 
receive visits from reporters, phone calls from lawyers, and confidential mail.” Id.  
Giarratano’s most well-known legal work is the civil case that he prepared for 
his co-plaintiff Earl Washington, an illiterate, mildly retarded inmate facing 
execution without a lawyer for his state habeas corpus proceedings. Although 
both the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, upheld Giarratano’s theory that the constitutional right to 
meaningful access to the courts required that indigent death row inmates receive 
court-appointed lawyers for state post-conviction proceedings, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), ultimately reversed in a 
plurality opinion. Nonetheless, Virginia and many other states subsequently 
enacted a law requiring the appointment of state post-conviction counsel in these 
circumstances. See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to 
Counsel in State Post-Conviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1086 n.45 
(2006) (observing that thirty-three of thirty-seven death penalty states now 
recognize a right to counsel for state post-conviction proceedings). And thanks to 
Giarratano—and a number of others who subsequently intervened—Washington 
lived long enough to be exonerated. Eric M. Freedman, Symposium, Earl 
Washington’s Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089, 1103 (2001). 
 182. Paradoxically, due to the emphasis in parole hearings on acceptance of 
responsibility and remorse, Giarratano’s assertion of innocence makes him less 
likely to be granted parole. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. 
REV. 491, 493 (2008) (“[A]dmitting guilt increases the likelihood of a favorable 
parole outcome for an inmate whereas proclaiming innocence serves to diminish 
the chance for release.”). Consequently, Giarratano has been denied parole on 
multiple occasions. See, e.g., 2009 Petition, supra note 124, at 87 (noting that 
Giarratano was denied parole in 2004 and 2007). Based on this record, the 
petition sought a conditional pardon for Giarratano, because “the stark and 
unjust reality is that he very likely is never going to be paroled . . . . Parole for 
Joe is an illusory hope despite the weighty, compelling, and longstanding record 
he has amassed that demonstrates he is deserving of immediate release.” Id. at 
86, 92. 
 183. See Haney, supra note 83, at 1450 (“[A] vast and elaborate system outside 
the courtroom, founded on misconception, supports the existence, operation, and 
increased popularity of the death penalty.”).  
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constructions of race, gender, and class, our culture would be safer, 
fairer, and more reflective of our collective humanity. 
